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From the Editor
The Combating Terrorism Exchange staff are happy to bring you the Spring 2018 
issue of CTX. The terrorism landscape looks different and also very much the 
same since our last issue came out in spring 2017. ISIS is on the run and no longer 
has a secure stronghold in Syria or Iraq. It has been pushed out of the large cities 
and towns it once held, but even partial victory has come at a tremendous cost 
in military and civilian lives, in treasure, and in the very structure of the besieged 
cities that ISIS held. Much of Mosul was destroyed to save it.
I’m reminded of an animated cartoon I saw when I was a young child. A man is 
trying to sleep, but a little cricket keeps chirping and waking him up. When the 
man tries to find the cricket, it stays quiet and eludes him, but as soon as he lies 
down and shuts his eyes, the cricket begins chirping. The man becomes steadily 
more frustrated and violent in his efforts to find and kill the cricket, until, in 
the end, his entire house lies in ruins. But the cricket is still chirping. I laughed 
at the man’s crazy behavior, but I also wondered whether he ever was able to 
sleep again.
Much of Syria and Iraq lies in ruins. Hidden bombs keep exploding in Kabul, 
gunmen and truck drivers keep attacking across Europe, refugee families keep 
hoping for asylum. ISIS, weakened and on the run, will nevertheless keep 
chirping the same ugly song as long as there are young men and women ready to 
listen to the message and join its jihad against the world. Will anyone ever rest 
again?
Anne Speckhard and Ardian Shajkovci of the International Center for the Study 
of Violent Extremism begin this issue with an unusual interview. The young 
man they speak with is an imprisoned former ISIS “emir” who proudly describes 
his role in teaching the ISIS brand of religious ideology to new recruits and very 
young children. It is only when Speckhard confronts him and plays recordings of 
former ISIS operatives mourning their participation in violent extremism that the 
young man’s self-image begins to crack.
The next article comes from Wael Abbas, who uses mapping technology to 
test Mao Zedong’s theory that terrain and population play a critical role in the 
ability of insurgencies to spread and hold territory. Taking the expansion and 
contraction of ISIS’s insurgency between 2014 and 2017 as a case study, Abbas 
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demonstrates that a supportive population and difficult landscape may be useful indicators of an insurgency’s long-term 
viability.
Our third essay concerns the UN’s efforts to stabilize the Democratic Republic of Congo after years of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency that have left the country devastated and the people traumatized. Authors Badura Hakimu and Heather 
S. Gregg describe why the program of security, demobilization, and reintegration, which ought to serve as a model for 
similar situations, has not met its goals.
The final feature article takes us to South Sudan, another country that is being torn to pieces by competing insurgencies 
and an ineffective—even complicit—government. Amarsaikhan Serdari served as Sector North Commander with the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan in 2015 and 2016. In that role, he witnessed firsthand how UN peacekeepers are 
handicapped by the lack of an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability in their efforts to provide security 
and prevent violence for fragile communities in a highly unstable environment.
This issue brings you two very different CTAP interviews. The first is with historian and military analyst Max Boot, who 
sat down with Anders Hamlin to discuss Boot’s new biography of US military adviser Edward Lansdale. Lansdale helped 
establish a democratic government in the Philippines in the 1950s and then tried to do the same, less successfully, 
in Vietnam. Boot and Hamlin examine the current geostrategic landscape and ponder, “What would Lansdale do?” 
The second interview, with Iranian-American scholar Reza Marashi, delves into US-Iran relations and the obstacles that 
prevent these two important countries from finding ways to work together toward common goals. Although the interview 
took place in the fall of 2016, Marashi’s insights remain cogent and useful for understanding the present rocky state of 
relations between the two countries, particularly in light of recent uncertainty about the current US administration’s com-
mitment to the seven-state nuclear deal.
For our book review, Stans Victor Mouaha-Bell discusses the book Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Move-
ment, written by Alexander Thurston. It’s a mistake, Thurston notes, to blame ideology alone for insurgencies while 
forgetting the role of politics. Finally, be sure to check out Christopher Harmon’s new book in the Publications section.
We’d love to hear from you at CTXEditor@GlobalECCO.org or on Facebook at Global ECCO whenever you read some-
thing in CTX that sparks your interest, raises questions, or demands a response. After all, you’re the reason we publish CTX. 
Send your article submissions, comments, and questions to CTXEditor@GlobalECCO.org. Keep up the great work. We 
hope to hear from you soon.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
Inside This Issue
Letter from the Editor ELIZABETH SKINNER
5 Confronting an Isis Emir
ANNE SPECKHARD, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AND ARDIAN SHAJKOVCI, 
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM
15 Maps in the Analysis of Insurgencies: The Case of ISIS
LTC WAEL ABBAS, LEBANESE ARMED FORCES
29 The Challenges of Demobilizing and Reintegrating Armed Groups in the Democratic
Republic of Congo
MAJ BADURA HAKIMU, TANZANIAN ARMY, AND HEATHER S. GREGG,  
US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
38 Dealing with Contingencies in South Sudan
COL AMARSAIKHAN SERDARI, MONGOLIAN ARMY
47 THE CTAP INTERVIEW
Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations
INTERVIEWED BY MAJ ANDERS HAMLIN, US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
57 THE CTAP INTERVIEW
Reza Marashi, National American Iranian Council 
INTERVIEWED BY DOUG BORER, US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
66 THE WRITTEN WORD
Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement by Alexander Thurston




Vol. 8, No. 1
Lieutenant Colonel Wael Abbas graduated from the American University 
in Beirut in 1999 with a BCE in civil engineering. In September 2000, Lt. 
Col. Abbas joined the Lebanese Armed Forces. He was commissioned as a 
Lieutenant Engineer upon graduating from the military academy. Lt. Col. 
Abbas’s decorations and awards include the Military Valor Medal and the 
Medal in the Fight against Terrorism. He holds a master’s degree in Defense 
Analysis from the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
Max Boot is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security 
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a columnist for the Wash-
ington Post, and a global affairs analyst for CNN. Boot has served as an adviser 
to US commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan and lectured on behalf of the US 
State Department and at many US and international military institutions. 
Before joining the CFR in 2002, Boot spent eight years as a writer and editor 
at the Wall Street Journal. He is a prolific author and regularly contributes to 
many publications, including Foreign Policy, the Los Angeles Times, the New 
York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. He holds a bachelor’s degree in his-
tory from the University of California, Berkeley (1991), and a master’s degree 
in history from Yale University (1992).
Dr. Douglas Borer is an associate professor of Defense Analysis at NPS, 
Monterey, California. He earned his PhD in political science from Boston 
University in 1993. Dr. Borer’s academic postings include the University of 
the South Pacific, the University of Western Australia, Virginia Tech, the 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, and the US Army War College. In 2007, he 
co-founded (with Dr. Nancy Roberts) the Common Operational Research 
Environment (CORE) Lab at NPS. In 2011, he and Dr. Leo Blanken created the 
Combating Terrorism Archive Project.
Dr. Heather S. Gregg is an associate professor of Defense Analysis at NPS, 
where she works primarily with US and international SOF. Prior to joining 
NPS, she was an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Dr. 
Gregg earned her PhD in political science in 2003 from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. She also holds a master’s degree from Harvard 
Divinity School and a BA in cultural anthropology from the University 
of California, Santa Cruz. She is the author of The Path to Salvation: 
Religious Violence from the Crusades to Jihad (University of Nebraska, 2014) 
and Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan (Uni-
versity of Nebraska, forthcoming in December 2018).
Major Badura Hakimu is an intelligence officer with the Tanzanian Army. 
Major Anders Hamlin serves in the US Army Special Forces. He earned his 
degree in Defense Analysis from NPS in 2017.
Reza Marashi joined the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) 
in 2010 as the organization’s first research director. He came to NIAC 
after serving in the Office of Iranian Affairs at the US Department of State. 
Prior to his tenure at the State Department, he was an analyst at the Institute 
for National Strategic Studies covering China-Middle East issues and a 
Tehran-based private strategic consultant on Iranian political and economic 
risk. Marashi is frequently consulted by Western governments on Iran-related 
matters. His articles have appeared in the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Policy, and the Atlantic, among other publications, and he has been a 
guest contributor on many broadcast outlets.  
Lieutenant Colonel Stans Victor Mouaha-Bell was educated at the 
Prytanée Militaire de La Flèche and the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-
Cyr, France. Following graduation in 2000, he served as a paratrooper 
platoon leader in multiple combat operations in central Africa and later in a 
variety of operational assignments. LTC Mouaha-Bell holds a master’s degree 
in political science from the University of Yaoundé II, Soa, Cameroon. On 
staff assignments, he participated in international meetings related to the 
fight against Boko Haram, including the African Union’s Defense and Safety 
Specialized Technical Committee and the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s 
defense meeting. He is currently enrolled in the master’s program in Defense 
Analysis at NPS. 
Colonel Amarsaikhan Serdari joined the Mongolian Armed Forces in 
1985. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in economics from the 
Military Academy of Mongolia in 1989 and was commissioned as a second 
lieutenant in the army. In 1993, he was selected to attend the Defense Lan-
guage Institute in San Antonio, Texas. Upon his return to Mongolia in 1994, 
he served in a variety of command and staff positions. As a major, Serdari 
served a tour to Iraq from 2003 to 2004 as a senior intelligence officer at 
the Headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force Seven in Baghdad. 
Posted to Brussels as a defense attaché to Benelux countries, he planned 
and executed Mongolia’s participation in NATO’s Kosovo Force operation. 
Beginning in October 2015, he served in Malakal, South Sudan, as Sector 
North Commander with the United Nations Mission. COL Serdari is a 2017 
graduate (CSRT) of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. 
Dr. Ardian Shajkovci is the director of research and a senior research 
fellow at the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism 
(ICSVE). He interviews ISIS defectors to study their trajectories into and out 
of terrorism, and he trains law enforcement, intelligence, education, and 
other professionals on the use of counter-narrative messaging materials to 
counter violent extremism. Dr. Shajkovci holds a doctorate in public policy 
and administration from Walden University. He earned his MA degree in 
public policy and administration from Northwestern University and his BA 
degree in international relations and diplomacy from Dominican University. 
Dr. Shajkovci is an adjunct professor at Nichols College, where he teaches 
counterterrorism and cyber security.
Dr. Anne Speckhard is an adjunct associate professor of psychiatry at 
Georgetown University School of Medicine and the director of ICSVE. She 
has interviewed over 600 terrorists, their family members, and supporters 
in various parts of the world. For the past two years, she and ICSVE staff 
have been collecting interviews with ISIS defectors, returnees, and prisoners, 
and developing the Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter-Narrative Project. Dr. 
Speckhard trains law enforcement and other professionals on the use of 
counter-narrative messaging materials, and consults on the rehabilitation of 
children used as violent actors by groups such as ISIS. In 2007, she led the 
design of the psychological and Islamic challenge aspects of the Detainee 
Rehabilitation Program in Iraq. She has consulted to NATO, OSCE, foreign 
governments, and many branches of the US government. Dr. Speckhard is the 
author of several books, including ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist 
Caliphate (Advances Press, 2016), Bride of ISIS (Advances Press, 2015), 
and Talking to Terrorists (Advances Press, 2012). 
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS
COVER PHOTO
Cover image: Child’s artwork depicting a Boko Haram attack. 




This journal is not an official DoD publication. The views expressed 
or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of any governmental or nongovernmental organization 
or agency of the United States of America or any other country.
TERMS OF COPYRIGHT
Copyright © 2018 by the author(s), except where otherwise noted. The Combating Terrorism Exchange journal (CTX) is a peer-reviewed, quarterly journal available free 
of charge to individuals and institutions. Copies of this journal and the articles contained herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, research, 
or educational purposes free of charge and without permission, except if otherwise noted. Any commercial use of CTX or the articles published herein is expressly pro-
hibited without the written consent of the copyright holder. The copyright of all articles published herein rests with the author(s) of the article, unless otherwise noted.
5
Spring 2018
Confronting an ISIS Emir: ICSVE’s Breaking 
the ISIS Brand Counter-Narratives Project 
Videos
Dr. Anne Speckhard, Georgetown 
University, and Ardian Shajkovci, 
International Center for the Study 
of Violent Extremism
Most experts agree that the most successful counter-messag-
ing campaigns against ISIS are the ones that use the voices of insiders—both ISIS 
victims and ISIS cadres who have firsthand knowledge of the group’s brutality, 
corruption, religious manipulation, and deception. With this in mind, we at the 
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) have spent the 
last two years in Western Europe, Turkey, Iraq, Central Asia, and the Balkans 
interviewing ISIS defectors, ISIS prisoners, and ISIS cadre returnees from the 
conflicts in Syria and Iraq.1 Their stories are captured on video and edited down 
to short clips, interspersed with actual ISIS video footage and pictures, and then 
turned back against imprisoned ISIS cadres as an intervention measure.
Using “formers” to talk back to terrorism is a well-established practice. Mubin 
Shaikh is a good example of someone who nearly joined al Qaeda and imbibed 
deeply of the jihadist ideology before turning away and infiltrating a Canadian 
terrorist cell to help law enforcement take it down.2 Usama Hasan, a former 
radical Salafi extremist and mujahedeen in the Afghan jihad against the coun-
try’s communist government in the early 1990s, is another example of someone 
who has turned against Salafi-jihadi ideology and is dedicated to fighting violent 
extremism in the United Kingdom.3 
Using formers to help deradicalize their peers is rife with problems, however. 
Those who have returned from ISIS were often psychologically unhealthy even 
before they joined, and are deeply traumatized upon their return. Some do not 
want to speak about their experiences, while others fear retribution from ISIS 
if they speak out against the group. Some of them fear further prosecution and 
social stigma. Others are unstable, reverse their positions frequently, or are not 
useful role models. Often, former fighters are ashamed of their past and want to 
hide it. They are not easily accessible and may be psychologically unable to carry 
out a supporting role in countering violent extremism. 
In April 2017, some colleagues and I spoke to Abu Islam, an ISIS “emir” (high in 
the military command) in a prison in Sulaymaniyah, in the Kurdistan region of 
Iraq. During this interview, we used two videos from ICSVE’s Breaking the ISIS 
Brand Counter-Narratives Project in a psychological intervention with him. The 
following is an account of that conversation.
Interview with Abu Islam
Dressed in an orange jumpsuit and wearing a black mask over his face, Abu Islam is 
brought into the faux wood–paneled room of the Special Forces Security compound 
in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. His hands are cuffed, and his feet are shackled together. 
There are five of us in the room: me (Anne Speckhard); Ardian Shajkovci; Alice, 
an American who is working with us; a Kurdish handler; and our Peshmerga 
interpreter, Alaz.4 I am seated at the front corner of the desk with my laptop 
“I saw that the  
Islamic State was 
living by shari’a law. 
They were throwing 
homosexual people 
from high buildings. 
If you steal, they cut 
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unfolded. Ardian is seated to my side. Alice and our handler sit behind the desk. 
Alaz takes the hooded Abu Islam from the prison guards and guides him gently 
to the center chair in front of the desk next to me, where he carefully lifts the 
mask from Abu Islam’s face before taking his own seat. Abu Islam’s dark, wavy 
hair, medium-length curly beard, and intense brown eyes are revealed. His dark 
eyes focus briefly on me, burning momentarily into mine, and then dart back 
again to Alaz. They know each other. Alaz has repeatedly interrogated him. 
Only in his mid-20s, Abu Islam has been hunted for two years by the Peshmerga 
forces who charge him with running a network of cells of suicide bombers, 
sending some as young as 12 to explode themselves in bombing missions. He is 
credited with either directly or indirectly organizing attacks that killed over 250 
victims, although some of the high-ranking Peshmerga counterterrorism officials 
we spoke to believe that number to be closer to 500. “He’s a guy we chased for 
more than two years,” stated the head of Kurdistan’s Zanyari intelligence service 
in a recent interview with journalist Robin Wright. “To pick him up and realize 
that we finally got him, it was a big catch for us,” he explained.5 
Born as Mazan Nazhan Ahmed al-Obeidi, Abu Islam is the second oldest of 
nine siblings in his family and the oldest male. His father served in former Iraqi 
president Saddam Hussein’s army. He describes his childhood as both “safe” 
and “nice.” Growing up in the oil-rich area of Kirkuk, Iraq, Abu Islam 
finished high school and then pursued university studies in shari’a 
(Islamic law) at the local university. With only one year left to go 
before graduation, Abu Islam abruptly left his studies to join 
the so-called Islamic State in 2014.
“I wasn’t Salafi growing up,” Abu Islam explains. 
The legs of his orange jumpsuit are rolled up to 
mid-calf—Salafi style—to match the dress 
worn by the Companions of the Prophet 
Muhammed. “I got that mentality in 
university when I read the book 
Tawhid by Wahhab. It convinced 
me,” he adds.
Abu Islam is referring to Kitab at-Tawhid 
[The Book of the Unity of God] by  
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an eighteenth-
century Saudi religious reformer who worked to 
purify Islam by turning back to following the original 
practices of the Prophet and his Companions. The violent 
followers of Wahhab, including al Qaeda and ISIS, interpret 
his teachings to justify killing those who do not follow their 
strict interpretation of Islam. ISIS, and groups like ISIS, practice 
takfir—an extreme extension of Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine that sanc-
tions violence against both Muslims and non-Muslims who are deemed 
as infidels (non-believers). This is the type of Islam and the ideology that 
Abu Islam had already embraced in his university studies; thus he was ready 
for ISIS when they came to Iraq and established themselves as the Islamic State of 
Iraq (ISI).
“I wasn’t Salafi growing 
up,” Abu Islam explains. 
“I got that mentality in 
university when I read the 
book Tawhid by Wahhab.”
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“I got into the brotherhood at the mosque,” Abu Islam 
explains. “They were against the Islamic State, but for me, 
I saw that the Islamic State was living by shari’a law. They 
were throwing homosexual people from high buildings. If 
you steal, they cut your hand. They are really living it.”
When asked where he saw this, Abu Islam answers, “It was 
on social media, YouTube. It made sense for me. I watched 
a lot of their videos.” As we listen to him speak, we were 
reminded of ISIS’s powerful online presence and the online 
propaganda machine that recruits youth via the Internet. 
Even in Iraq, ISIS propaganda videos reached this univer-
sity student, persuading him of their righteousness: “I was 
convinced and made up my mind.”
“They were on the streets also. They had a territory twice 
the size of Great Britain. At the time I joined, I was 22 or 
23. A lot of my relatives were in the area [ISIS] took over, 
and some of my cousins and family members were already 
in [ISIS]. It was easy to join. I got a recommendation,” Abu 
Islam explains, referring to ISIS’s practice of trusting po-
tential recruits based on the recommendation of another 
member of ISIS. “They knew I don’t drink or smoke and 
that I’m a shari’a student. That made my CV look really 
good,” he explains, smiling enthusiastically.
“I didn’t take shari’a training,” Abu Islam answers proudly 
when asked about ISIS’s known practice of putting new 
recruits through two weeks of shari’a training to learn the 
basics of Islam as they preach it and to take on their “hear 
and obey” philosophy.6 “I gave lessons in shari’a.” This is 
how Abu Islam initially describes his role in the Islamic 
State. “I became the teacher because of my background,” 
he continues. He also bypassed military training because 
they needed shari’a teachers to train the others: “They 
didn’t teach me weapons. In the beginning, they asked me 
if I knew how to use an [AK-47 assault rifle], and of course, 
I did.” The knowledge of assault rifles is common among 
Iraqis, notes our Peshmerga interpreter.
It appears there are not large camps for the Cubs of the 
Caliphate in Iraq, compared to the camps in Syria where 
hundreds of youth are gathered, trained, and taught to 
fight—with some being trained and prepared to become 
suicide bombers—after they graduate.7 In Iraq, it seems 
the Cubs are gathered into smaller groups. Individuals 
like Abu Islam appear to serve as their itinerant preachers, 
traveling from one group to another.
“Sometimes there were four to five or six to seven [indi-
viduals]. It depended. I’d go to the villages and teach them. 
I moved from place to place to give shari’a lessons,” Abu 
A Cub of the Caliphate
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Islam explains. “It was mostly fiqh [the principles and understanding of Islamic 
practices]: how to pray properly, how to fast, how to help other Muslims, how to 
pay zakat [obligatory charity], and about the Islamic State.”
In Syria, ISIS defectors interviewed in our ISIS Defectors Interview Project 
described their shari’a trainers as “shining charismatics” and were heartened by 
learning “true Islam” from them.8 I ask Abu Islam whether the Iraqi recruits 
already knew their religion or were also gladdened by these teachings. He 
answers, “They didn’t know the right way. We taught them the right ways. We 
talked about what [the Islamic State] could be. Hopefully, we’ll expand our terri-
tory. According to our beliefs, we can’t say we are definitely doing it. Instead, we 
say, inshallah [by God’s will] we will expand our territory. Open the walls. Take 
down Europe.”
Abu Islam tells us that there were “young fighters from foreign places” in his 
classes, but “they didn’t understand much Arabic,” which reminds us of an 
Albanian I interviewed in Kosovo who also recalled taking ISIS shari’a training in 
Arabic—it all went over his head. 
We came to Iraq on this trip to speak at the Iraqi prime minister’s conference, 
Education in Iraq Post Daesh-ISIL Territory. The conference brought together 
local and international experts to address the issue of the estimated 250,000 to 
500,000 youth who lived and served under ISIS in the Nineveh and the Mosul 
regions of Iraq between 2014 and 2017. Universities were closed under ISIS. 
Libraries were burned to the ground. Textbooks, even for the very young, were 
replaced by texts that taught them how to behead enemies and indoctrinated 
them in the Islamic State’s barbarity and its refusal to recognize anyone else’s 
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dreams is already a man 
ready for battle.
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of Paradise and promise 
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when they push the button 
to explode themselves.
captured ISIS texts. Picking them up and handling them gave each of us a chill 
down the spine—touching the same books ISIS cadres had handed out to 
children under their control.
The schools in the area continued to run even after ISIS took over, Abu Islam 
explains, adding, “They used to study English. It was good for us—knowing 
English—but we denied books that we didn’t like. After a while, we denied all 
the existing books. We changed all the books over to our mentality.”
“How did you talk to the kids who were going on suicide missions?” I ask, going 
back to his role as a shari’a trainer. “What did you teach them to persuade them 
to go on suicide missions?” I ask this, already knowing from our interviews with 
Syrian ISIS defectors that ISIS leaders fill the children’s minds with bright visions 
of Paradise and promise that they will feel no pain when they push the button to 
explode themselves—that they go instantly to Paradise. The faint-hearted ones 
are even offered a sedative, and in many cases, the youngest do not even realize 
they are about to die.9
“We used to tell them ...” Abu Islam begins, but then quickly detours into denial. 
“It was not my job exactly.” He hesitates and then continues, “Study and learn 
your future. We want to expand our territories and put shari’a over the whole 
earth. Most of the time they came as volunteers, self-motivated.” Asserting that 
the kids chose themselves as “martyrs,” he gains confidence again, “They have 
read the Book. We make the way for them. We never told anyone they have to 
go. It’s voluntary. It’s never forced. I didn’t see anyone forced, ever.”
“So, when you prepared young children to take ‘martyrdom’ missions—driving 
explosive-laden cars or wearing vests into enemy lines or checkpoints—what did 
you teach them? How did you prepare them?” I ask, having already learned from 
Peshmerga counterterrorism officials that Abu Islam sent children as young as 
12 years old on suicide missions. 
Abu Islam exudes disagreement with how the question was asked and explains 
that ISIS never takes children into its ranks: “In Iraq, you have to be 18 to sign up 
for the Army. We [ISIS] don’t have any age limit. Instead we believe that when a 
man’s semen develops, then he’s considered a grown-up man. We only take them 
when they get to that point. They were never children. They were men.”
Cynical about how he answered the question, I further probe: “How old were 
these men, according to your criteria?” 
“A fully-grown man has to have his semen,” Abu Islam reiterates. “This is 
according to shari’a.” The translator interjects by explaining that, according to 
Abu Islam’s definition, a young boy who begins having wet dreams is already a 
man ready for battle and mature enough to sign his life over for a “martyrdom” 
mission. 
While Abu Islam denies there was any pressure in ISIS for children to become 
“martyrs,” we know from ISIS defector interviews that in the Syrian training 
camps, youth are heavily pressured into driving explosive-laden cars into enemy 
lines and lied to about the painfulness of their deaths—and sometimes fail to 
even understand that their mission involves death. “There is an office. If anyone 
volunteers—‘I want to give my bayat [pledge]’—then he signs up for a martyrdom 
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mission at the same time. It’s like a regular recruiting 
process,” Abu Islam explains.
He is further asked about the training camps and how they 
are provided with a steady stream of explosive-rigged cars 
to put the children in and send them to their deaths at 
checkpoints and the frontlines. 
“There is a training camp they take them to and teach 
them how to set up and use these cars,” he explains. “‘It’s a 
regular camp,’ they tell them.” He hesitates again. “The car 
manufacturing is in a different place,” he detours. 
“But what do they tell these children?” I push.
“They instruct them. They know what will happen. They’re 
happy. It’s like a kid at Christmas. You know how happy 
they are? Calmly happy, knowing something good is going 
to happen,” Abu Islam explains, as we witness how he truly 
embraces this sickness.
“Is there any ritual to go with this?” I 
ask further, wondering exactly how they 
send a kid off to his horrific death.
“[The ISIS senders] have a list of se-
rial numbers and names. If I’m set to 
go next, then I’m next. If something 
changes the order and they aren’t sent, 
they start crying. If they aren’t the next one, they actually 
cry and get angry, and even complain, ‘My name is set to 
go!’ I’ve seen this with my own eyes,” Abu Islam explains, 
as his eyes appear to shine in admiration for their zeal.
“What happens right before you go?” I ask again.
“There is nothing special they do.”
“Pray? Wash? Celebrate? Make a video?” I press, since 
in the past I have sat with relatives of bombers who have 
seen the videos of their children wrapped up in explosive 
vests or jammed into explosive-laden vehicles, with some 
children crying and others seemingly jubilant about going 
as “martyrs.”
“There is nothing special. They wash up to be clean. 
Everyone prays. Everyone says goodbye. There are tears of 
joy. We make a video,” he admits, but again adds a denial, 
which is possibly self-protective, given he is a prisoner and 
does not want to incriminate himself. “I didn’t make the 
videos. I sent them to Kirkuk,” he explains.
“Do they receive a sedative?”
“No sedative, ever.”
“What’s the usual way to go? Car or belt?” 
“Both,” he answers. “They wear the belt in the car just in 
case one goes down,” he adds.
“What are their instructions?” I further ask. “Kill as many 
as possible?”
“Yes.”
“Any special conditions? What if there are women and 
children at a checkpoint?” I probe.
“In the front line, everyone is an enemy. Everyone is a 
target,” Abu Islam intones but quickly adds, “In cities, we 
tell them to try to avoid targeting the markets and civilians, 
and they have specific targets—military and government 
targets.”
“And you?” I ask about his recent arrest 
in which he was wearing, but did not 
detonate, his suicide vest. “I didn’t sign up 
to be one. I did fight.” He goes on to say 
that he has fought in all three ISIS tactical 
military formations, including in the very 
front line where the fighters go in wearing 
vests and “martyr” themselves if overtaken, 
killing everyone around them to avoid capture. He was 
never one of those front line cadres, yet he states, “I always 
had my suicide belt on. We jump into the [Peshmerga] 
helicopters and explode ourselves. There is no surrender. 
No surrender. Just push the button.”
“But you did surrender,” I state. “You wore the belt. Did 
you have it in your mind, when captured?”
“You didn’t have time to detonate or didn’t want to do it?” 
inquires Alaz, our Peshmerga translator, explaining to us 
that he never had the chance to ask him this question and 
would like to know the answer as well.
“I didn’t want to die. I wanted to live, so I didn’t do it,” 
Abu Islam states matter-of-factly, despite the fact that he 
has sent plenty of others to do just that. “I wanted to finish 
the project, spreading shari’a,” he adds.
“Were you scared?” I ask.
“Yes,” he admits. “I was scared. Every human being is 
scared.”
I have sat with relatives of 
bombers who have seen 
the videos of their children 
wrapped up in explosive 




I ask Abu Islam about ISIS’s policy toward captured women, a question that instantly grabs his attention. He is in his 
element spouting out shari’a law on the rights of ISIS cadres with regards to captured women. “It becomes a right,” he says, 
while looking around the room in which three out of five present in the room are women, waving his arm to bring us all 
into his sweeping gesture. “If I dominate everything in this room, then it becomes mine. I do as I want. It all becomes the 
property of the Islamic State,” he adds.
While we are usually capable of listening to anything without having much of a reaction during the interview, we feel 
suddenly sickened imagining how close to Mosul we have been in the past days—barely an hour’s drive—and how this 
mindset has been a harsh reality for so many captured women, whether they be Yazidis, Christians, Shia, or Sunni.
Abu Islam denies that he had a sabaya [sex slave]. He also explains that very few Iraqis had them. He can think of only one 
man in their area of ISIS, Dr. Mahavia, who had one. This is likely similar to the Syrian experience where married Iraqis 
who served from home are not seen by ISIS leadership as needing to be supplied with a woman. Yet, we will also hear from 
an unmarried Iraqi who took full sexual advantage of the enslaved women held in this region of Iraq.
As we continue interviewing Abu Islam, though I am calm, I feel increasingly irritated at how he is able to justify the brutal 
and inhumane practices of ISIS and to offer arguments in support of their activities. Before my next question, I decide to 
show him one of our ICSVE-produced videos denouncing ISIS. I open my computer and ask if he would be willing to watch 
the video of another ISIS cadre (a defector) speaking on this subject. I inform him that it is a short video—only four min-
utes—and with his agreement, I begin to play it. Abu Islam watches intently as a former ISIS cadre from Syria, Ibn Ahmed, 
explains his horror and post-traumatic stress after being the guard for 475 Yazidi, Shia, and Sunni sex slaves, including his 
role in organizing mass institutionalized rape. 
Abu Islam’s eyes dart along the pictures in the video taken from ISIS, taking in faces and places he may recognize, just as 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighter Huthaifa Azzam did when we showed him the same video.10 “He is an Iraqi,” Abu Islam 
comments. I tell him no, this is a Syrian, but he has a similar accent because he is from Deir ez-Zor. The video plays as Ibn 
Ahmed paints a grim picture of rape and horror for young captured women separated from their men and children. As 
more horrifying images of Yazidi and other women abused by ISIS appear on the video, Abu Islam’s gaze falls to the floor. 
Suddenly, he is silent and stunned to see his glorified version of ISIS described in this graphic manner. 
ISIS Victim
12
“[The boy] is calling you the 
kafir. How do you feel about 
that?” I ask after we view the 
clip. “Do these children have 
their semen? Are they men?”
CTX 
Vol. 8, No. 1
“How do you feel watching this video?” I gently ask.
“I was against that idea,” he says. His voice sounds flattened by what he has just 
viewed. “It doesn’t matter. When I see this video … this is the outcome of this 
practice—this video. It’s not the proper way to turn you to Islam. It’s not a good 
way to spread our beliefs.” Referring back to the rapes, he adds, “Not everyone 
listens [to objections]. They just go with it. There are more that like it [raping 
captured women] than are against it.”
“How about the beheadings?” I ask.
“It was a law,” he answers. We cannot help but see discomfort in his face as he 
patiently awaits his next question.
“Is it not the same thing? Does it not also spread a negative view of Islam?” I ask.
“I got convinced,” Abu Islam answers defensively.
“How do you feel now?”
“It’s not right,” he says, gazing down at his hands, and adds, “We were wrong.”
“Is there a way to get there without all this violence?” I ask, knowing he harbors 
the dream of spreading shari’a and making a utopian world where Islam reigns 
above all else.
“Yes, of course,” he answers. 
“Why did you sign up to violence?” I ask, although I know that the United 
States and the US-led coalition’s security blunder in Iraq, which led to the 
ousting of Saddam Hussein’s senior military and intelligence officials, coupled 
with more than a decade of sectarian killings, gave birth to ISIS. 
“I believed back in that time,” Abu Islam explains. “I got convinced,” he adds. He 
explains about how ISIS seemed to be a righteous and Islamic answer to sectarian 
power struggles and security issues: “I didn’t know it was going to be that way.” 
We ask Abu Islam if he is willing to watch another ICSVE-produced video. When 
he agrees, we show him our four-minute video clip of a 15-year-old Syrian boy de-
scribing his time in the Cubs of the Caliphate and how the leaders sent children 
as young as six years old in explosive-laden vehicles to their deaths—many having 
no idea they were about to die. There are pictures of children younger than eight 
in the film. Abu Islam watches this clip intently as well, again studying every-
thing in it. At the end, the boy denounces ISIS, calling them kafirs [unbelievers] 
and infidels.
“[The boy] is calling you the kafir. How do you feel about that?” I ask after we 
view the clip. “These are little kids. Do these children have their semen? Are they 
men?” I challenge, feeling angry with his denials. 
Abu Islam is stunned into silence and again stares at the floor.
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Screen captures from ICSVE video
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We end our interview. The guards come into the room, and Abu Islam’s black mask is once again placed back over his face 
as he lets them guide him blindly out of the room. 
Postscript
Abu Islam is by no means rehabilitated after watching two counter-narrative videos. That being said, capture, interroga-
tion, and imprisonment have all begun to work on him. After being challenged with the harsh realities of ISIS and other 
ISIS cadres denouncing the group, he admits to not knowing whether ISIS was right. After all, joining ISIS has not worked 
out that well for him. Once confronted with the truth told by other former ISIS cadres, he is unable to keep up his false 
bravado and unquestioned beliefs in ISIS’s interpretation of shari’a law. His arguments fall flat. He is backed into submis-
sion, as evidenced by his responses after watching the videos. 
We have focus-tested the Breaking the ISIS Brand videos in the Balkans, Central Asia, Western Europe, and the Middle 
East, and they have overwhelmingly hit their mark. No one we spoke to questioned their authenticity or viewed the mes-
sage as being wrong. Many are sobered by them, including the ISIS emir we interviewed for this article. v
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“How do you make this right between you and Allah?” I ask softly, wondering if 
he will open up more.
“Allah will accept everything—if you admit it,” he answers back, continuing to 
stare at the floor in shame.
“Did you make a mistake?” I ask.
“Yes. We were mistaken,” are his last words.
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Maps in the Analysis of Insurgencies:  
The Case of ISIS
LTC Wael Abbas,  
Lebanese Armed Forces
When researchers 
refer to guerrilla 
warfare strategies, 
many of them  
reference the  
methods and  
theories crafted  
by Mao Zedong.
When the Mongols invaded parts of Europe in the early thir-
teenth century, they possessed an uncontested cavalry, highly sophisticated siege 
weapons, great discipline, and unmatched tactics and strategies.1 They defeated 
the great empires of the East and tried to achieve similar successes by expanding 
west into a vulnerable Europe that was weakened by the struggle between the 
Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II and Pope Gregory IX. After the Mongols suc-
ceeded in invading Poland and Hungary, however, they abruptly retreated from 
Europe amid serious preparations to invade Austria. While historians give many 
reasons for the sudden withdrawal of the Mongols, some argue that “they halted 
just beyond the Danube because this was the furthest extent of the Eurasian 
steppe,” which created some difficulties related to “the number of horses the 
Mongols had and the amount of grazing ground available in Hungary and in the 
rest of Europe.”2 If this reasoning is true, we can say that the availability of grazing 
represented a boundary or limitation for the Mongols’ invasion of Europe.  
While researchers can find other historical cases of military campaigns that 
faced similar limiting conditions or boundaries, this article applies a similar con-
cept to modern insurgencies, using ISIS as a case study. It explores answers to 
the following questions: Are there any “boundaries” that limited the expansion 
of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and if yes, what are the conditions that defined them? 
Can this concept apply to other insurgencies, or does ISIS represent a unique 
type of insurgency? Finally, how can this concept help in analyzing modern 
insurgencies in their different stages of development?
It is important to note that the variables included in this analysis do not exclu-
sively define the conditions for the success or failure of an insurgency. Many 
other factors can come into play. The significance of the variables analyzed here, 
however, allows for a good understanding of certain dynamics related to the rise 
and fall of insurgencies. 
Conditions for a Successful Insurgency
Typical insurgencies usually resort to guerrilla warfare strategies based on 
popular mobilization. When researchers refer to guerrilla warfare strategies, 
many of them reference the methods and theories crafted by Mao Zedong and 
promulgated in his famous pamphlet, titled Guerrilla Warfare, during the Chi-
nese resistance to the Japanese occupation in 1937. The introduction to a transla-
tion of this pamphlet summarizes the main requirements for successful guerrilla 
warfare as recommended by Mao.3 The first condition is the “organization, 
consolidation, and preservation of regional base areas situated in isolated and 
difficult terrain.” As explained by military historian B.H. Liddell Hart, “rugged 
or forest country is the most favorable for guerrillas. Deserts have diminished 
in value for them with the development of mechanized ground forces and 
aircraft.”4 The second is a cooperating and sympathetic population that provides 
logistical and informational support, in addition to providing the main source of 
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recruitment. Better knowledge of the terrain and the ability to dissolve among 
the population enable the guerillas to be in “an impenetrable fog” while the 
enemy “stands on a lighted stage.”5 As a result, the guerrillas engage the enemy 
only when the conditions are in their favor, and they withdraw when the tides 
are against them as they aim to draw the enemy into a protracted conflict. 
Mao conceived guerilla war as progressing in three phases: the organization/
consolidation/preservation phase, the expansion phase, and the decisive/destruction 
of the enemy phase.6 In the first phase, the insurgents establish isolated base areas 
for recruitment, training, and indoctrination. In the second phase, the insur-
gents increase their capabilities in personnel and weapons and conduct more 
attacks on enemy targets. In the decisive phase, the insurgents become powerful 
enough to conduct conventional military operations to destroy the enemy and 
increase their territorial control.
Many researchers argue that guerilla warfare strategies can be applied by dif-
ferent insurgencies regardless of their ideology. The operational problem in 
guerilla warfare, according to one argument, is
overcoming the conventional military superiority of the state (or 
occupying power) through an asymmetrical campaign based on 
the support (and resources) of a constituent population. While the 
[Marxist insurgency] will attempt to draw support from among 
a revolutionary class (classically, the peasantry), the non-Marxist 
insurgency will define its natural constituency along different lines 
(e.g., ethnicity, communal affiliation, or regional identity).7 
Researchers who study Salafi jihadist groups observe that these groups have ap-
plied insurgency strategies, especially those recommended by Mao.8 For instance, 
the “Strategic Plan for Reinforcing the Political Position of the Islamic State of 
Iraq,” circulated by Iraqi jihadists between December 2009 and January 2010, 
recommended using guerrilla tactics to weaken the Iraqi units in areas where the 
government had a weak presence, in an attempt to create security gaps. These 
gaps would allow jihadists to seize these areas and benefit from the resources 
abandoned by the Iraqi forces. The authors of the plan did not forget the second 
necessary condition for a successful insurgency recommended by Mao: the 
population. They explained that jihadists would not succeed in establishing 
their state in Iraq without gaining the loyalty of the Sunni tribes.9 A few years 
earlier, an al Qaeda franchise released an online book titled The Management 
of Savagery by an unknown author named Abu Bakr Naji. The book presented 
a similar strategy to what was presented later in the “Strategic Plan,” describing 
how the jihadists should aim at creating “security vacuums or ‘regions of savagery’ 
in the periphery of the state.”10 The jihadists would then control these regions 
and try to gain the support of the tribes by providing security and public goods, 
establishing Islamic law, and indoctrinating the people. After establishing a 
network of these controlled regions, the book urged jihadists to try to merge 
these regions into an Islamic state.
An article titled “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State 
Movement (2002–2016)” took the argument one step further by applying a 
detailed analysis of how the jihadist groups that preceded the Islamic State 
implemented Mao’s three phases of revolutionary warfare between 2003 and 
2014.11 In the building phase, following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
A book titled The Management 
of Savagery describes how 
the jihadists should aim at 
creating “security vacuums 
or ‘regions of savagery’ in 
the periphery of the state.”
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Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established a network of jihadists in several weak regions 
of the country. His organization, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), moved to the expansion 
phase over the next three years and took control of most of Anbar province 
in 2006. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) declared itself in October 2006, a few 
months after al-Zarqawi was killed by a coalition air strike. The United States, 
however, by supporting the Sunni Sahwa (Awakening) councils in Diyala and 
Anbar provinces, expelled ISI from the region in 2007 and forced it back to the 
preservation/building phase. Despite this setback, the political problems in Iraq 
and the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011 gave ISI a chance to recover and move 
to the expansion phase again with the capture of Mosul in 2014.
This article applies a similar concept to analyze the expansion and retreat of 
ISIS after 2014 based on Mao’s three phases of revolutionary warfare but with a 
different methodology. The use of maps and spatial data to analyze these phases 
adds a new dimension to the analysis: terrain and population are considered to 
be necessary conditions for the success of any insurgency, and consequently can 
define both its potential and limitations.
Spatial Analysis of Insurgencies: ISIS as a Case Study
Geographic information systems, spatial analysis, and maps have been used as 
powerful analytic tools in different fields of study, including crime and ter-
rorism. For instance, a special report by the US Department of Justice highlights 
the importance of using different mapping techniques to study crime patterns 
and identify criminal “hot spots.”12 In the case of terrorism, a study analyzed 
the spatial and temporal patterns of terrorist attacks in Iraq between 2004 
and 2006 in an attempt to predict and counter future attacks.13 Another study 
focused on possible logistical constraints for the spread of insurgency in Russia’s 
Northern Caucasus by analyzing the effect of existing road networks on the 
spread of violence.14 
The methodology presented in this article uses spatial data to map the develop-
ment of an insurgency—ISIS, as a case study—through the different stages 
outlined by Mao. The study evaluates how each stage relates to the two main 
conditions for a successful insurgency—regional bases located in isolated and 
difficult terrain and a sympathetic population for logistical and informational 
support—according to four variables. Two variables relate to geographic features 
(terrain and land cover), and the other two relate to the population (population 
density and the geospatial distribution of ethnoreligious groups in Syria and Iraq). 
The advance and retreat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq for the period between June 
2014 and December 2017 is mapped with respect to the variables of terrain and 
population, using snapshots of critical moments in the conflict. This method may 
reveal ISIS’s progress from one phase to another according to Mao’s terminology, 
and may also help clarify why the advances and retreats occurred as they did.
ISIS is an adequate case study for our analysis for two reasons. First, ISIS passed 
through different stages of expansion and retreat between 2014 and 2017, thus 
providing a sufficient time frame and adequate data for the analysis. Second, ISIS 
is viewed by some experts as a unique case because it did not follow the strate-
gies used by other insurgencies. Therefore, if the results of this present analysis 
contradict this view by showing that ISIS fits into Mao’s framework of protracted 
war, then its findings may be usefully generalized as a model for analyzing other 
insurgencies.
The political problems in 
Iraq and the start of the 
Syrian conflict in 2011 gave 
ISI a chance to move to the 
expansion phase again with 
the capture of Mosul in 2014.
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Mapping ISIS’s Territorial Expansion and Retreat
The start of the Syrian conflict in 2011 gave the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) a 
chance to recover from its defeat in Iraq in 2007. Once it took control of 
areas in northern and eastern Syria, including the city of Ar Raqqah in 2013, 
ISIS succeeded in expanding back into Iraq.15 In the summer of 2014, ISIS forces 
seized the city of Mosul on 10 June, followed by Tikrit on 11 June.16 By 21 June, 
ISIS had already consolidated its capabilities in regions where the presence of the 
Syrian and Iraqi governments was weak, mainly in northeastern Syria and in the 
Ninawa and Anbar provinces in Iraq. 
On 5 July, at the Great Mosque of al-
Nuri in Mosul, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi declared himself caliph of the 
restyled “Islamic State.” The invasion of 
Mosul in 2014 marked the group’s move 
from the consolidation phase to the 
early expansion phase. The population 
density map in figure 1 reveals that until 
this stage, ISIS controlled areas of low 
population density. Regardless of the 
loyalty of the population, ISIS did not 
expand into regions of high population 
density, including Mosul, until it had 
the material capability to control them.
Moreover, these areas were dominated 
by a sympathetic Sunni population, 
as shown in figure 2. The supportive 
population played a critical role at 
this stage, as it did in Fallujah, which, 
although geographically close to 
Baghdad, has historically been resistant 
to the government and was the first 
region to come under ISIS control, in 
January 2014. Although the Sunni 
tribes played a major role in defeating 
AQI in these regions, ISIS used the sec-
tarian divisions that dominated Iraq to 
present itself as a plausible and better 
alternative to the Iraqi government. 
The elevation and dominant land 
cover maps (figures 3 and 4), however, 
show that the ISIS-controlled regions 
up to this stage are low-elevation areas 
(less than 250 meters) that are mostly 
desert or have sparse vegetation. This 
is rather strange for insurgencies, 
which generally prefer safe havens in 
mountainous or covered areas (forests, 
jungles, swamps, and the like) because 
such areas present real challenges for 
Figure 1. Population Density, 21 June 2014
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Figure 2. Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups, 21 June 2014
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conventional forces. Examining these 
geographic maps in relation to the 
ethnoreligious map in figure 2, however, 
reveals that the mountainous areas in 
western Syria have mixed populations, 
while those in northern Iraq are purely 
Kurdish. In the consolidation phase, 
it appears that ISIS focused on areas 
that were distant from the strongholds 
of the Syrian and Iraqi governments 
irrespective of the terrain—which was 
probably more a matter of availability 
than of choice—and dominated by 
a religiously supportive population. 
Moreover, given its initial material 
weakness, ISIS likely preferred areas 
with low population density that 
were easier to control. These unsuit-
able geographic conditions, however, 
ultimately played a decisive role in the 
group’s defeat in the later stages of the 
conflict, when ISIS lost these areas in a 
fast and dramatic way. It seems likely 
that the inhospitable conditions made 
ISIS extremely vulnerable, as would be 
expected for any similar insurgency.
In the months following the capture of 
Mosul and Tikrit, ISIS approached the 
end of the expansion phase and sought 
to move to the decisive phase with 
a boost in capabilities that included 
recruitment, financing, and weapons 
that it had seized in the occupation of 
Mosul. This allowed the terrorist group 
to conduct more attacks and occupy 
more territory in an attempt to connect 
its regional bases. In Iraq, ISIS seized Tal 
Afar, Baiji, Qaiim, and Rutba, culmi-
nating its successes with the capture 
of Sinjar in August 2014, where ISIS 
fighters committed a horrible massacre 
of thousands of ethnic Yazidis.18 In 
Syria, ISIS invaded Al Bab, Manbij, Tal Abyad, Deir az-Zur, Al Bukamal, and 
areas near Al Hasakah city. The map in figure 5, which shows ISIS-controlled 
areas as of September 2014, reveals that ISIS linked its areas of control in Syria 
and Iraq by seizing areas similar to the ones they controlled in the previous 
phase. The cities of Sinjar, Aleppo, Manbij, Tal Abyad, and Al Hasakah also had 
a supportive population and lay at the periphery of the state’s control, but in this 
phase, ISIS clearly attempted to penetrate into regions with ethnically different 
populations and harder terrain. These military operations indicate that ISIS was 
moving toward the end of its expansion phase and into the decisive phase. In 
Figure 3. Elevation, 21 June 2014
Figure 4. Dominant Land Cover, 21 June 2014
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complex theaters with multiple actors, which is the case in both Syria and Iraq, however, the phases are not as clear as they 
would be if one insurgency were confronting one government. ISIS was moving into different phases depending on the op-
ponent. Before the US-led coalition’s intervention in support of the Kurdish fighters, the Kurds appeared to be the weakest 
opponent from a military standpoint, and so ISIS attempted to expand at their expense.
In December 2014, ISIS moved to the decisive phase against the Kurds in Syria, penetrating into the heart of the Kurdish 
territories in northern Syria and taking control of parts of Kobani, as figure 6 illustrates. 
Figure 5. Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups, 10 September 2014
Figure 6. Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups, 5 December 2014
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Figure 7 shows that the Syrian Kurdish regions attacked by ISIS in the autumn of 2014 had higher population densities 
than the areas ISIS controlled in the earlier phases of its insurgency. ISIS conducted conventional military operations 
exactly as Mao prescribed for this stage, mobilizing its forces and attacking in unobstructed terrain. It seems, however, that 
ISIS advanced prematurely to the decisive phase, by failing to take into account the US-led coalition’s announcement in 
September 2014 that it was planning a military intervention. The airstrikes conducted by the coalition in support of the 
Kurdish forces in Kobani prevented ISIS from delivering a decisive defeat to the Kurds and helped the Kurdish People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) win the battle of Kobani in December 2014. Kurdish forces fully recaptured the city on 27 January 
2015.19 On the Iraqi front, coalition airstrikes halted the advance of ISIS and helped clear its fighters from Mount Sinjar in 
December 2014, and from some parts of Sinjar city. 
The first few months of 2015 witnessed a mix of successes and defeats for ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. As ISIS was forced 
back to the consolidation phase in the Kurdish areas of Syria and in most of the regions where it operated in Iraq, it moved 
ahead with the expansion phase against the Syrian regime, which seemed extremely vulnerable during the first half of 2015. 
In April 2015, ISIS lost Tikrit to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), but it seized Ramadi and the strategic Al Walid–Al Tanf 
border crossing in May and the areas between Rutba and Al Walid in August. In Syria, ISIS saw major success expanding 
northeast of Palmyra, capturing the city of Palmyra on 20 May and Al Quaryatain on 26 May.20
ISIS’s expansion in Syria at the expense of the Syrian government carried all the signs of the decisive/destruction of the enemy 
phase. ISIS invaded Palmyra and its surrounding regions by conducting conventional military operations. The militants also 
expanded into regions of mixed Christian and Alawi populations near Al Quaryatain, into more difficult mountainous 
Figure 7. Population Density, 5 December 2014
As ISIS was forced back to 
the consolidation phase in 
the Kurdish areas of Syria 
and in Iraq, it moved ahead 
with the expansion phase 
against the Syrian regime.
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terrain, and closer to the Syrian capital of Damascus during this same period, indicating a perception of power superiority over 
the Syrian regime. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate this phase of expansion.
Even as the Syrian regime seemed to be losing ground against ISIS in many areas, a Russian military intervention in 
September 2015 in support of the Syrian government reversed the tide in its favor.21 One more time, an external military 
intervention forced ISIS back into the consolidation phase. Facing opponents supported by two superpowers, ISIS lost 
ground in many parts of Iraq and Syria at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016.22 Pro-regime forces supported by 
Russian airstrikes retook Palmyra on 27 March 2016. The setbacks continued as ISIS militants lost control of the city of 
Manbij to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on 15 August. A few days later, Syrian opposition groups backed 
by Turkey seized the town of Al Rai 
in Northern Aleppo province. These 
forces later moved south to take control 
of the town of Dabiq on 16 October, 
thus undercutting the narrative of ISIS, 
which claimed the town would be the 
location of the decisive end-of-times 
battle between Islam and the West. 
Meanwhile, Turkey also supported the 
forces that seized Jarablus from ISIS 
on 24 August 2016, and by September 
2016, ISIS had no presence on the 
Syrian-Turkish border.23
Although the pattern of losses that ISIS 
endured is related in part to the strate-
gies of its adversaries, the overall picture 
reflects Mao’s phases of revolutionary 
war. ISIS lost areas in a succession that 
was the reverse of what happened in 
the expansion phase: areas closer to 
the important strongholds of the state, 
higher population areas, and areas 
with adversarial ethnoreligious groups, 
especially Kurdish and Shia regions. 
In Syria, all the actors fighting ISIS 
have represented, in a way, the “state” 
fighting an insurgency. All these actors 
were working to establish their own 
version of a state and had the means 
to achieve their ambitions, especially 
with the support of an external power. 
The Syrian government, supported by 
the Russians, showed that it still had 
the power and legitimacy to preserve 
a united Syria by competing for the 
areas controlled by ISIS. Meanwhile, 
the Kurds did not hide their ambitions 
for an independent state and had the 
impression that if they—with the 
support of the United States—defeated 
ISIS, they would have the right to rule 
their regions. The Syrian opposition 
Figure 8. Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups, 13 August 2015
Figure 9. Elevation, 13 August 2015
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groups, although weak at this stage, found support from Turkey, which wanted to keep the Kurds divided and away from 
its borders. 
As a result, ISIS retreated against all three actors, withdrawing first from the areas where its opponents enjoyed a supportive 
ethnoreligious population or had strategic reasons for sustaining a significant military presence (see figure 10). For instance, 
the Syrian Army advanced east from its areas of control in Homs to retake control of Palmyra, which represented an impor-
tant supply route between eastern and western Syria and would be central for the military operations advancing toward Deir 
az-Zur. In the north, while the Syrian Army advanced east of Aleppo (Syria’s second major city), Turkey supported the 
opposition forces that seized 
Jarablus, a strategic town directly 
on its border with Syria, followed 
by Al Rai in Northern Aleppo 
province, in an attempt to control 
the important city of Al Bab and 
prevent the Kurds from joining 
their regions east and west of the 
Euphrates River. Meanwhile, the 
US-backed Syrian Democratic 
Forces, dominated by the Syrian 
Kurdish YPG, controlled the city 
of Manbij, an ethnically mixed 
town directly adjacent to the 
ethnic Kurdish areas.
In Iraq, a similar dynamic came 
into play. ISIS lost Sinjar city 
in November 2015, Ramadi in 
December 2015, Hit in April 
2016, and Fallujah in June 2016.24 
ISIS first lost the areas closest to 
the Iraqi government’s centers of 
power near Baghdad (Ramadi, 
Hit, and Fallujah) and those 
closest to the Kurdish regions, 
such as Sinjar. Mosul, which is 
closer to the Kurdistan region 
than Baghdad, was the next 
target. Because it is dominated 
by a Sunni Arab population, the 
Kurdish Peshmerga, although 
they controlled countryside 
outside the city, would have to 
wait for the Iraqi Army to attack 
Mosul itself. Figure 11 shows 
the progress of these military 
operations.
In 2017, ISIS retreated farther 
to the periphery of Syria, into 
mostly desert regions away from 
areas with high population, 
adversarial ethnoreligious groups, 
Figure 10. Military Advance Lines of Different Groups in Syria, 17 October 2016
Figure 11. Military Advance Lines in Iraq, 17 October 2016
24
CTX 
Vol. 8, No. 1
and strongholds of the Syrian govern-
ment and the Kurds. This shift signaled 
an increasing weakness that forced 
ISIS back into regions suitable for the 
preservation/organization phase. On 23 
February 2017, the Turkish-backed Free 
Syrian Army seized the important town 
of Al Bab from ISIS.25 At the same time, 
the Syrian Army advanced southeast 
of Al Bab on 27 February, coming 
into proximity with both the Turkish-
backed opposition forces in Al Bab 
and the US-backed Syrian Democratic 
Forces in Manbij.26 In March 2017, the 
Syrian Army recaptured Palmyra, which 
had been invaded by ISIS for the second 
time in December 2016.27 In Ar Raqqah 
province on 6 June 2017, after eight 
months of offensive operations under 
“Operation Euphrates Wrath,” which 
was launched to isolate the city of Ar 
Raqqah, the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF), supported by US airstrikes, for-
mally announced the start of military 
operations to retake the city. The SDF 
had major successes against ISIS during 
these operations, particularly on 10 May 
2017, when it captured Al Tabaqah, 
an area famous for being the site of 
Syria’s largest dam.28 On the other side, 
pro-regime forces backed by Russian 
airstrikes expanded into western Ar 
Raqqah province near Al Tabaqah on 
13 and 14 June 2017. These forces also 
advanced east of Palmyra, securing the 
Palmyra–Deir az-Zur highway on 12 
June 2017, followed by Al Sukhnah, in 
preparation for an advance into Deir 
az-Zur province.29 Ar Raqqah city 
represented ISIS’s last urban stronghold 
in the center of Syria, and after the loss 
of this city, ISIS retreated towards Deir 
az-Zur province on the Iraq border, as 
shown in figure 12.
In the second half of 2017, ISIS lost its remaining territories in Syria and Iraq. 
The sequence of losses continued as before: ISIS was pushed from the center 
outwards mainly to desert regions, from higher population areas to lower ones, 
and farther away from areas dominated by adversarial ethnoreligious groups, as 
shown in figure 13.
Figure 12. Military Advance Lines in Syria, 18 July 2017
Figure 13. Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups, 6 October 2017
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The Syrian regime’s forces lifted the 
three-year siege of the industrial city 
of Deir az-Zur in September, followed 
by Al Mayadin in October; the Syrian 
army finally reached Al Bukamal on the 
Iraq border in November. At the same 
time, the Kurds attacked from their 
regions in northern Syria and took con-
trol of the eastern side of the Euphrates 
near Deir az-Zur.30 In Iraq, the ISF 
completely liberated Mosul from ISIS’s 
control in July, followed by Tal Afar in 
August and Hawija in October. The ISF 
finally expanded its operations towards 
the Iraq-Syria border to take control 
of Qaiim in November.31 Without 
any urban areas under its control, ISIS 
was forced to return to the preserva-
tion phase in the vast deserts on the 
border between Iraq and Syria, and 
hide among the local tribes. It seems, 
however, that the Iraqis had learned from their past experience with AQI; in 
November the launch of a military operation to clear ISIS from these desert areas 
was announced. At the same time, the Syrian government announced its intent 
to clear ISIS from the uninhabited areas along the Euphrates River on the other 
side of the border. 
Conclusion
ISIS followed Mao’s three phases of revolutionary warfare in its expansion and 
retreat during the four years of conflict in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017. 
It seems strange to expect a jihadist Islamist movement to follow the insurgency 
strategies historically linked to Marxist and national insurgencies. Contrary to 
the conventional wisdom on insurgencies, however, ISIS applied these strategies 
because, as explained by Mao, they are strategies not of choice but of necessity, 
“imposed by the initial material weakness of the opposition.”32 Therefore, it is 
logical that any insurgency would resort to these strategies because they repre-
sent a natural tendency towards survival and self-preservation, and offer the best 
chance for an insurgency to achieve its goal of defeating a superior enemy. The 
methodology presented in this article, which uses maps and spatial analysis to 
analyze the conditions of terrain and population available for an insurgency at 
the different stages of its development, is a powerful tool for understanding and 
countering future insurgencies.
Studying the geographic and population conditions available to an insurgency 
can give an indication of the outcome of the conflict at an early stage. The 
geography of Syria and Iraq played a decisive role against ISIS. If the terrain in 
the Sunni areas where ISIS enjoyed some population support had been more fa-
vorable—for example, mountainous or forested—ISIS probably would have had 
a better chance of success, or at least better prospects for protracting the 
conflict even in the face of great military powers like the United States and 
Russia. In Afghanistan, for instance, the Taliban have survived a long US military 
Figure 14. Dominant Landcover, 6 October 2017
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campaign against them because they can take advantage of both a supportive 
population and difficult terrain. The prevalence of sympathetic Sunni tribes in 
many regions of Afghanistan, especially in the mountainous areas on Pakistan’s 
border, have played a major role in the Taliban’s ability to avoid a decisive defeat 
over the years. In the words of Mao Zedong, “If we do not fit guerrilla opera-
tions into their proper niche, we cannot promote them realistically.”33 Such a 
strategic failure is exactly what caused the dramatic defeat of ISIS. ISIS had no 
realistic prospects for a successful insurgency because it lacked the favorable 
conditions of both terrain and population, which set limitations on its expan-
sion and success. In this context, Iraq and Syria can hardly represent the “proper 
niche” for ISIS or any other Sunni jihadist insurgency.   
This analysis of ISIS as a case study shows that the conditions of terrain and 
population work in combination; having both favorable terrain and a sympa-
thetic population at the same time is critical for the success of an insurgency. 
This adds to the challenges faced by insurgencies and lowers their prospects of 
success. On the one hand, an insurgency that limits itself to isolated, difficult 
terrain with low population density will not be able to grow and expand. On the 
other hand, an insurgency that enjoys high levels of popular support in open and 
accessible terrain will find it very hard to defend itself against a superior enemy.
Consequently, a government can focus its resources on depriving the insurgents 
of either of these conditions: favorable terrain or supportive population, de-
pending on which is easier to achieve. A complete analysis of these conditions 
should precede the crafting of a counterinsurgency strategy to make it more 
efficient in defeating the insurgency. The proposed spatial analysis helps identify 
the most critically vulnerable regions, where the favorable conditions of terrain 
coincide with a large supportive population. Based on these findings, most 
military and intelligence resources should be allocated to these regions as a 
short-term solution. The government should also increase its presence in isolated 
areas regardless of the size of the population and the need to provide services. 
Over the long run, the government should develop infrastructure in the coun-
tryside and any isolated regions, a policy which can serve the state’s goals in two 
ways: responding to the grievances of the population might lower the popula-
tion’s support for the insurgents’ cause, and making these regions more accessible 
by investing in roads, airports, communication services, and other infrastructure 
would deprive the insurgents of much-needed isolated terrain. 
Moreover, understanding the dynamics of advance and retreat for ISIS or any 
other insurgency in light of Mao’s three stages of revolutionary war can help 
states craft corresponding counterinsurgency strategies. As Iraq has experienced 
twice so far, it is not enough to achieve a decisive military victory against an 
insurgency to guarantee it will not recover. The recommended strategy in this 
case is to follow ISIS to the areas that are most suitable for the building/ 
preservation phase, in the remote deserts on the Iraq-Syria border, and respond 
to the grievances of the tribes in these regions to prevent any future support for 
the resurgence of ISIS. v
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Demobilizing and Reintegrating Armed 
Groups in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo
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Violence in the 
eastern part of DRC 
has been particularly 
destructive, and new 
armed groups have 
emerged despite the 
peace accords.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced 
armed conflict both internally and with its neighbors since the mid-1990s.1 The 
presence of a variety of armed groups, including foreign fighters, Congolese 
militias, and rebel forces, has become a major obstacle to peace and security 
in the region. These armed groups have violated human rights through acts 
that include murder, kidnaping, torture of civilians, mass rape, the use of child 
soldiers, and the burning of houses and entire settlements. These conflicts have 
killed hundreds of thousands and affected millions of lives.2 
In an effort to halt the warfare, DRC signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
in July 1999.3 This landmark agreement led the UN Security Council to pass 
Resolution 1279 on 30 November 1999, which established the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 
with the goal of facilitating the ceasefire agreement and disengaging all warring 
parties. Three years later, on 17 December 2002, the main Congolese factions 
signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, which called for a program 
of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants.4 
With international support, the DRC created four distinct DDR programs to 
help end hostilities in the country: a DDR Reintegration and Resettlement (RR) 
program aimed at repatriating foreign fighters, two national programs aimed at 
demobilizing a variety of Congolese rebel and militia groups, and one program 
that focused specifically on the province of Ituri, where violent rebel groups were 
particularly active. 
Despite these efforts to end hostilities and stabilize the state, the population has 
continued to experience insecurity and violence. Violence in the eastern part 
of DRC has been particularly destructive, and new armed groups have emerged 
despite the peace accords and DDR programs. Ultimately, the 
protracted violence and lack of security within the country and 
region demonstrate that these DDR programs were unsuccessful, 
especially because many ex-combatants have returned to their 
original jobs as fighters. 
This article provides insights into why the DDR(RR) programs 
failed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It proposes that 
five shortcomings led to the programs’ demise: an unrealisti-
cally short timeline to accomplish the stated goals, inadequate 
funding, an overemphasis on disarmament, the failure of the 
DRC government to enact meaningful security sector reform 
and create competent security forces, and the DRC’s troubled 
relationship with neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda. 
Overall, the DDR(RR) programs in DRC did not place enough 
emphasis on long-term efforts during the “reintegration” phase, 
which was the intended goal of DDR. Successful reintegration 





































go beyond illegally armed individuals, including security sector reform, good 
job opportunities for ex-combatants, and mechanisms for reconciliation and 
rebuilding trust within the communities that receive ex-combatants. 
DDR Programs and Conflict Resolution
A disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program aims to transi-
tion legally and illegally armed individuals from combatant to civilian life.5 
According to the UN’s DDR Resources Center, “the objective of the DDR process 
is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that 
recovery and development can begin.”6 DDR, in other words, is an integral part 
of peacebuilding and sustainable development in post-conflict environments.7 
Typically, DDR programs begin with a call for ex-combatants to disarm. The 
rationale behind disarmament is that ex-combatants with weapons pose security 
threats to the state, civilians, and countries bordering the conflict state. The dis-
armament component of DDR usually includes sorting, controlling, recording, 
verifying, and destroying weapons and explosives.8 In some cases, ex-combatants 
are given cash for their arms in a “buy back” program.9  
Demobilization is a course of action for regulating and controlling the transfor-
mation of former soldiers from combatant to noncombatant status.10 Demobi-
lization often starts with disarmed ex-combatants being confined to designated 
centers or camps before being returned to society.11 In addition to persuading the 
former combatants to lay down weapons and stop fighting, neutral international 
agencies provide various types of assistance, typically in the form of financial 
support, which helps these former fighters to begin a new life.12 These programs 
often also provide opportunities for the government to compile information and 
figures on the physical, emotional, and social well-being of the former soldiers—
information that the government can use to address the obstacles that may pre-
vent these individuals from habituating to noncombatant life.13 Demobilization 
is typically followed by reinsertion, which is a preparatory step in the rehabilita-
tion process that provides moral and psychological support to ex-combatants, 
and sometimes to their families, for a short period. Tangible support can include 
food, clothing, shelter, health care, and psychological counseling.14 
Reintegration, typically the final phase in DDR programs, aims to strengthen 
the skills and well-being of former soldiers so that these individuals can achieve 
social and economic reintegration with their communities and not return to 
fighting. This phase may provide training in skills needed for self-employment, 
assistance finding a regular job, education opportunities, and long-term 
economic assistance.15 Reintegration is typically the most expensive and time-
consuming stage in the DDR process and if done well, successfully transitions 
fighters back to being peaceful and productive citizens. In some cases, additional 
steps to the DDR program are added, including the repatriation and resettlement 
of foreign combatants. 
Ultimately, successful DDR programs require considerable time and resources 
and clear goals to be successful. The effectiveness of such programs depends on 
the ability of the state to promote humanitarian assistance, support economic 
and social development, deploy reliable forces to provide security for the popula-
tion, and demonstrate the needed political resolve.16 In post-conflict countries, 
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these very aspects of the state are often weak and ineffective, making the imple-
mentation of DDR programs difficult.
DDR Programs in DRC
Initial efforts to create a DDR program in DRC began with the 2002 Pretoria Ac-
cords between the governments of DRC and Rwanda.17 These accords included a 
DDR program aimed at demobilizing, disarming, and repatriating foreign forces 
in DRC, specifically Rwandan fighters. The Congolese Army was given 90 days 
to complete this mission.18 Ultimately, the program succeeded in disarming only 
402 individuals, and there was a disagreement on the number of repatriated 
troops. Rwanda claimed it withdrew 23,400 troops during the timeframe.19 The 
DRC, however, claimed that 20,000 Rwandan soldiers remained in the eastern 
region of Kivu. One UN report from 2003 claimed that Rwandan forces in the 
DRC, under the umbrella of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR), had not been demobilized at all.20
Rebels, militia groups, and the DRC government signed another peace deal, the 
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement Peace Accords, on 17 December 2002.21 
The Congolese government launched a nationwide DDR program as part of these 
accords. The first phase ran from October 2004 to December 2006; the second 
phase started in July 2008 and was completed in December 2009. Alongside 
this nationwide program, a separate DDR program was created in Ituri province 
to run from 1 September 2004 to June 2005. Ultimately, the first phase of the 
nationwide DDR program succeeded in demobilizing 102,014 individuals, dis-
arming 186,000 individuals, and integrating 83,986 individuals into the national 
army. The second phase of the DDR program claimed to have demobilized 4,782 
individuals, in addition to disarming 12,820 individuals and integrating 8,038 
individuals into the national army.22 The Ituri program reported demobilizing 
15,811 individuals and collecting 6,200 weapons, of which 70 percent turned 
out to be old and unusable.23 Several agencies disputed the figures on disarmed 
militias in Ituri. The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), for example, claimed that 12,500 combatants were disarmed, while IRIN 
News put the figure at 9,000.24 
Although the exact number of those repatriated, demobilized, and disarmed remains 
debatable, hundreds of thousands participated in these DDR programs, making them 
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some of the largest in the region, if not the world. Despite a large number of partici-
pants, however, violence and insecurity have persisted in the DRC. 
Shortcomings of the DDR Programs in the DRC
As mentioned above, five main factors contributed significantly to the 
shortcomings of the DDR programs launched in the DRC: an unrealistically 
short timeline, inadequate funding, an overemphasis on disarmament, the 
failure of the DRC government to enact meaningful security sector reform 
and create competent security forces, and the DRC’s troubled relationship 
with neighboring countries. 
Aerial view of camps for people displaced by conflict
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All of the DDR programs initiated in the DRC suffered 
from unrealistically short timelines. The initial DDR(RR) 
program targeted external fighters such as former uni-
formed troops from Rwanda, Forces Armées Rwandaises 
(FAR), the FDLR, a Hutu nationalist militia in DRC, and 
forces of the Interahamwe, a Hutu paramilitary organiza-
tion. The program allowed only 90 days for both the 
pullout of Rwandan armed forces and the dismantlement 
of former FAR forces and Interahamwe.25 This timeline, 
measured in days and months, did not allow enough 
time for progress toward solving the major issues of 
demobilizing, disarming, dismantling, and repatriating 
the militias, but instead increased pressure on officials to 
achieve quick results. The program’s overseers were not 
able to tackle the most difficult problems associated with 
removing and repatriating these outside forces from within 
DRC, such as identifying and gathering foreign fighters, 
some of whom had been in the country for decades. Nor 
was there sufficient time to train, mobilize, and consoli-
date enough government troops to oversee the process. 
The short timeline also did not allow 
sufficient time for UN forces to deploy 
and help implement the repatriation 
process. Initially, the MONUC deployed 
only 8,700 troops in the DRC, not 
nearly enough to oversee such a large 
DDR program or provide general secu-
rity to the areas where the DDR process 
was occurring.
Another key obstacle to successfully executing the DDR 
programs in DRC, both in the short term and over time, 
was the lack of adequate funding. An insufficient allotment 
of funds (USD$200 million) caused the DDR program to 
run out of money halfway through the proposed process 
and created gaps in services for those wishing to demobi-
lize and those already demobilized. International assistance 
allocated only USD$14 million for integration and army 
reform.26 This lack of funding greatly hindered security 
sector reform initiatives and made it difficult to integrate 
irregular fighters who wished to join the DRC military. 
The lack of success in the DDR(RR) program and national 
DDR programs in the DRC can also be attributed to an 
overemphasis on disarmament. The DDR(RR) program suc-
ceeded in disarming only a reported 402 individuals.27 The 
nationwide DDR program disarmed 186,000 individuals 
in the first phase and 12,820 individuals in the second 
phase.28 In Ituri, between 9,000 and 12,500 combatants 
were disarmed.29 The total number of weapons that were 
collected through the national program is unknown, but 
the figure was 6,200 weapons for the Ituri program, of 
which 70 percent were old and unusable, suggesting that 
ex-combatants did not truly disarm.30 Ultimately, given the 
hundreds of thousands of armed individuals in the DRC, 
the number of those who were disarmed is low.
Perhaps one of the greatest obstacles to lasting peace 
in the DRC has been the lack of security sector reform 
throughout the country, particularly in the east. This 
failure has negatively affected the rule of law, civil order, 
and the justice system. The government’s inability to 
create competent, professional security forces and deploy 
them throughout the country caused citizens to take 
up arms to provide their own security. The absence of 
government-provided security in the eastern region, for 
example, especially in the rural areas, created an unstable 
environment that impelled citizens to join militias and 
armed groups for self-protection. Corruption in local 
government structures further undercut overall popular 
support for the government, including any security it 
provided.31 Under the supervision of traditional chiefs, 
communities took to hiding weapons 
for self-protection from both criminal 
gangs and government security forces 
and organized local militia groups for 
protection, which further weakened the 
progress of the DDR programs. Thus, in-
effective governance and lawlessness in 
eastern DRC created fertile conditions 
for the emergence of militia groups that 
threatened the security of the local population, despite the 
implementation of the DDR programs.
Finally, DRC’s relations with neighboring countries has 
continued to be a challenge to peace and stability. Rwanda, 
in particular has continued to meddle with DRC militias. 
For example, according to one report, Rwandan deserters 
from the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique 
du Congo (FARDC) aided Congolese Tutsis in forming 
the March 23 (M23) rebel group after the DRC government 
failed both to protect the Tutsi population in North Kivu 
from Hutu militias and to dismantle the FDLR.32 In March 
2013, the UN passed Resolution 2098, which authorized 
the use of offensive operations in the eastern DRC to 
counter M23, and the rebel group was finally neutralized 
in November 2013.33 Clearly, more work is needed to build 
better relationships between the DRC and its neighbors, 
and to create mechanisms for removing foreign fighters 
from DRC.
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Creating Better DDR Programs in DRC 
The protracted armed conflict in DRC is the product of decades of poor gov-
ernance, ethnic conflict, interference and spillover violence from neighboring 
states, and insufficient and unprofessional security forces. Decades of insecurity 
have produced an array of illegally armed groups and militias with a variety 
of different goals. Given this complicated and lengthy history, creating a DDR 
program that truly reintegrates ex-combatants back into civilian life or integrates 
them with government forces requires a holistic approach that focuses not only 
on the fighter but also on society, the economy, and the government. And while 
this task is enormous, steps taken in the near term could help move DRC in a 
better direction.
First, DDR should be understood as a long-term process, and the goal should 
be the “R”—reintegration—which creates the conditions for ex-combatants to 
take their place in society as productive and peaceful citizens. The temptation in 
DDR programs is to focus on demobilization and disarmament because these are 
short-term efforts and highly measurable; however, demobilization and disarma-
ment are more measures of performance than they are measures of effectiveness. 
In the end, the goal should be to reintegrate ex-combatants into society and give 
them incentives to stay demobilized and possibly disarmed over the long haul. 
Demobilization, in other words, should be a step towards reintegration—not its 
own goal. As the program unfolded in DRC, hundreds of thousands of illegally 
armed individuals were demobilized, but there is little evidence to suggest that 
these individuals stayed demobilized. Persistent insecurity, lack of jobs, and 
conflicts within local communities have prevented many of these individuals 
from moving beyond demobilization to reintegration.
Similarly, focusing on disarmament does not guarantee reduced violence or 
stability. In countries that have experienced protracted conflict, weapons tend to 
be plentiful and focusing on removing all or most weapons from a conflict zone 
is time-consuming, expensive, and ineffective. As the conflict in the DRC has 
shown, individuals turned in old or non-functioning weapons rather than truly 
disarming, thus rendering the disarmament program pointless. 
Focusing on reintegration requires addressing a multitude of problems beyond 
the presence of illegally armed individuals. Most notably, ex-combatants need 
to have a pathway to earning a living; without a job and the ability to provide 
for their families, fighters are unlikely to lay down their weapons. Post-conflict 
countries, however, often have weak economies and lack opportunities for indi-
viduals to earn a living. Furthermore, communities receiving ex-combatants must 
be prepared for them and find mechanisms for reconciliation and rebuilding 
trust. Without the buy-in and acceptance of the local population, efforts at truly 
reintegrating ex-combatants are unlikely to succeed.
International donors could help the reintegration process work by providing 
funding for job training over an extended period of time. In particular, the focus 
should be on initiatives that aim to develop human capital, including education, 
vocational training, and farming skills for the whole community, not just for 
ex-combatants. This one effort—human capital development at the community 
level—could go far in transforming conflict zones and helping them become 
more economically productive and harmonious spaces. The development of 
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human capital could thus become a vehicle not only for 
reintegrating former soldiers but also for rehabilitating 
war-torn communities. Similarly, jobs programs could be 
structured in such a way as to reintegrate ex-combatants 
and help them work towards reconciliation with their 
communities and societies.34 UN Development Pro-
gramme-funded fishing cooperatives in Ituri, for example, 
helped bring villagers and former combatants together to 
work for a mutually beneficial purpose.35 
Perhaps the greatest challenge with DDR programs is that 
their success requires commitment from several govern-
ment sectors. In a state that is attempting to end internal 
conflict, DDR and security sector reform must take place 
simultaneously to address shortcomings in government 
security forces and the threat of illegally armed individuals 
and groups.36 In the case of the DRC, the country’s security 
forces were small, poorly equipped, and inadequately 
trained, all of which greatly hindered their role in the DDR 
process. As noted earlier, international donors directed 
only a small portion of the total budget for the entire DDR 
program to reforming the DRC’s military.37 The interna-
tional community clearly did not see security sector reform 
as a priority. 
In addition to insufficient numbers of 
properly trained and equipped govern-
ment forces, the UN mission in the DRC 
was unable to mobilize enough MONUC 
forces or deploy them quickly enough 
to help provide security and oversight 
of the DDR process. The result was a 
security vacuum in critical areas, particu-
larly outside major cities, and an inability to successfully 
identify, repatriate, and demobilize foreign fighters and 
domestic militants. The rushed timeline of the DDR 
programs made matters worse because it did not allow 
adequate time to mobilize or deploy the MONUC forces, 
nor did it provide time to better train and professionalize 
DRC forces for the DDR mission. 
Alongside security sector reform, the rule of law should 
be considered one of the fundamental ingredients in the 
overall DDR process. The rule of law has all but disappeared 
in parts of the DRC as a result of protracted conflict and 
poor governance. In some provinces, government forces 
are as much a threat to the local population as illegally 
armed individuals and groups. Under these conditions, 
the government is unable to create security, establish 
rule of law, or build trust with the population. To help 
reestablish security and civil structures, the UN and other 
international organizations should have provided better 
and longer training of the DRC’s security forces, including 
better human rights training. As it was, very little time 
and money went into professionalizing DRC’s forces. In 
addition, international organizations should have provided 
desperately needed training for lawyers and judges, the lack 
of which has undermined due process and the prosecution 
of war-related crimes. In both the short and long run, 
security is unlikely to take hold without a strong justice 
system, and justice is not possible without addressing rule 
of law—the ability to enforce the law and the capacity to 
prosecute those who violate it.
Finally, international organizations and regional actors 
need to rigorously address the role that neighboring coun-
tries have played and continue to play in the persistent 
violence in the DRC. Former Rwandan forces, in particular, 
have been a major source of instability. The presence of 
several Hutu nationalist forces within DRC, including 
the FDLR and Interahamwe, and the rise of the Tutsi M23 
(which Rwanda allegedly funds), have perpetuated conflict 
in the Kivu region and caused ongoing 
civilian casualties and human rights 
violations, particularly against the Tutsi 
populations. Although some of the 
peace accords attempted to address the 
persistence of Rwandan rebel forces in 
DRC and compel their repatriation, these 
measures did not completely remove the 
Rwandan militants or pressure the Rwandan government 
to make meaningful changes. The DDR programs in DRC 
demonstrate that, in many cases, demobilizing armed com-
batants requires a transnational or even regional approach 
in order to stabilize a country and end the fighting.  v
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Dealing with Contingencies in South SudanCOL Amarsaikhan Serdari,  
Mongolian Army
The conflict in South 
Sudan is unlikely 
to cease in the near 
future, and there are 
indications that it is 
turning into a  
protracted one.
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011) to “consolidate peace and security, and 
help establish conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan.”1 
Over the past few years, however, UNMISS has been highly criticized by the 
international community for failing to carry out its mandate. The Security 
Council’s mandate tasks the peacekeepers with protecting civilians, deterring 
human rights violations, creating conditions conducive for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, and supporting the conflict resolution agreement in South 
Sudan. These tasks are all of equal importance, and UNMISS has made a great 
deal of progress in implementing each of them. Nevertheless, critics believe that 
UNMISS has mismanaged recent crisis situations or in some cases, completely 
failed in its response. Specifically, UNMISS has been accused of failing to protect 
civilians in Malakal, Upper Nile State, in February 2016 and of being useless in 
Juba, the nation’s capital, when serious fighting broke out among South Sudanese 
factions in July 2016. 
As a result of these incidents, the UN Security Council decided to send a Regional 
Protection Force to the young African nation and increase UNMISS’s troop level 
by 4,000.2 Many of those who monitor the security situation in South Sudan 
are asking, “Will the Security Council’s mandate be better implemented with 
a larger UNMISS force? Will the additional force become a ‘game changer’ and 
improve the performance of UNMISS?” Although it might sound discouraging, 
the short answer to these two questions is no. The additional force might 
temporarily, and to some degree, stabilize the security of Juba, but it will not 
improve the overall performance of UNMISS or contribute significantly to the 
implementation of the mandate without several further improvements to the 
force’s capabilities.
Background
After more than five decades of struggle, the 
people of South Sudan managed to gain their 
independence, and a new nation, the Republic 
of South Sudan, was born on 9 July 2011. At the 
same time, a new UN peacekeeping mission, the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan, was 
established. South Sudan, however, enjoyed 
relative peace and stability for only two years. In 
December 2013, President Salva Kiir, a member 
of the Dinka tribe, accused his deputy, First 
Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, of plot-
ting a coup and attempting to seize power and 
dismissed him from office.3 The accusation was 
justified, and violence broke out in the capital 
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and Nuer soldiers opened fire on each other. The violence 
quickly spread to other parts of South Sudan and became 
a civil war that, over a period of two years, took the lives 
of more than 50,000 people, most of whom were innocent 
civilians, and displaced approximately 800,000 others.
The rival leaders signed a peace agreement in August 2015, 
after many months of peace talks and negotiations held 
in neighboring capitals. Riek Machar finally came back to 
Juba in April 2016. The two sides formed a Transitional 
Government of National Unity, and the opposition leader 
once again became First Vice President of South Sudan. 
This time the peace lasted only three months. Things went 
terribly wrong in July 2016, when some of the government’s 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) soldiers, manning 
a checkpoint in Juba, clashed with a patrol of Machar’s 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-iO). 
Over the following days, the clash turned into full-scale 
fighting with heavy weaponry including tanks, large caliber 
guns, and attack helicopters. Ironically, the fighting took 
place in the capital city over the country’s Independence 
Day. More than 300 people lost their lives, thousands 
sought protection in UN camps in Juba, and several 
thousand fled the country.4
The situation in South Sudan remains volatile and 
uncertain at present, and in many analysts’ assessments, 
the country is again on the brink of an all-out civil war. 
Despite the peace agreement and various international 
arrangements, including the ones facilitated and supported 
by the so-called Troika (Norway, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States), the African Union’s Peace and 
Security Council, and the Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development, the government of South Sudan and 
the opposition are unable to resolve their differences. In 
addition, the conflict is further deepening rifts between 
the Dinkas, Nuers, Shilluks, Mabanese, and other tribes of 
South Sudan. The conflict is unlikely to cease in the near 
future, and there are indications that it is turning into a 
protracted one.
UNMISS’s Problem 
There are two primary reasons, among many, for UNMISS’s 
ineffectiveness in controlling the violence: the first is its 
inability to move freely and intervene where needed, and 
the second is that it lacks the means to “see and hear” the 
operational environment. UNMISS is unable to move freely 
because both the government of South Sudan and the op-
position intentionally use their respective forces to prevent 
UNMISS from being able to reach and intervene in conflict 
areas. The South Sudanese place restrictions on UNMISS’s 
ground, air, and riverine movements so frequently that 
UNMISS has faced difficulties in recent years just moving 
the supplies and personnel it needs to sustain its bases. 
Peacekeepers are often being denied access to conflict 
zones by SPLA and SPLA-iO soldiers, and there have been 
instances when well-equipped and armed peacekeepers 
UN team visits Tonga, Upper Nile State in November 2015. This is a group photo of the team with SPLA-iO leaders. 
(Faces have been blurred for privacy.)
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were stopped and turned back just a few meters away from their own bases. 
UNMISS’s complaints of movement restriction, which they consider violations of 
existing status of forces agreements, are usually ignored by both the government 
and the opposition. 
Most, if not all, movements of supplies and people require UN military personnel 
to provide force protection and liaison support, but the restrictions persist, so 
having a large peacekeeping force—currently 12,760 strong—is no help to UN-
MISS. Although some say the peacekeepers are not up to their tasks and are not 
capable of doing anything, this is not the case. They are quite capable of fulfilling 
their tasks when they know and understand their operating environment. UN-
MISS’s peacekeepers are reluctant to force their way through SPLA and SPLA-iO 
checkpoints because they do not know what to expect down the road or on the 
way back to base. They are hesitant to secure an airport without assurances that 
the SPLA or SPLA-iO are not going to come back with a heavier force. They are 
not willing to stand their ground without knowing that they will succeed in 
their mission. In short, UNMISS’s peacekeepers do not want to take unnecessary 
risks when they are unsure that they can prevail over their adversaries. What the 
peacekeepers need is foresight and information—intelligence—on terrain, water, 
weather, population, and most importantly, on the adversary. UNMISS needs to 
be equipped with an adequate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capability to be effective and able to deal with challenging situations, including 
restriction of movement. 
A Solution to the Problem
ISR capability is absolutely necessary for UNMISS to be effective in South Sudan. 
ISR would improve the mobility and intervention capacity of the peacekeeping 
force by reducing uncertainty, improving situational awareness, and increasing the 
confidence of the peacekeepers when they are faced with obstacles such as restric-
tion of movement. ISR would also significantly improve the overall performance 
of the troops in protecting civilians, deterring various threats to UN personnel and 
humanitarian aid providers, and supporting cease-
fire agreements, all of which will contribute to the 
full implementation of the Security Council’s 
mandate.
The following three incidents demonstrate the ur-
gent need for UNMISS to have ISR capability. The 
incidents took place in the past few years, and it 
is very likely that others like them will occur in 
the future. Each event resulted in the loss of not 
only UN property and supplies, but also many 
lives, and the outcomes damaged the credibility 
of the United Nations and its peacekeeping force. 
Each one could have been averted had UNMISS 
possessed an adequate ISR capability.
The Kaka Crisis
In late October 2015, SPLA-iO forces took UNMISS 
personnel hostage and seized UN transport ships 
ISR would reduce 
uncertainty, improve 
situational awareness, and 
increase the confidence of 
the peacekeepers when they 
are faced with obstacles such 
as restriction of movement.
Indian Army contingent commander in Renk briefs Sector North 
Commander. Renk, Upper Nile State, December 2015
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with vital supplies in Kaka, Upper Nile State.5 UNMISS relies on barge convoys to transport and deliver bulky items, sup-
plies, and heavy equipment along the Nile River to bases in remote areas of South Sudan. In early October 2015, a convoy 
of UN barges moved from Mangalla to Malakal, where it offloaded its main cargo. The decision was then made to deliver 
goods and materials to Melut and Renk in Upper Nile State, where other UN bases were located, using the same barge 
convoy. On 24 October 2015 the barges and some boats—codenamed LifeLine 14—sailed north from Malakal to Melut. 
After reaching and offloading at Melut, the LifeLine convoy continued its journey northward on 26 October, intending to 
deliver supplies to the UN base in Renk, a city located close to the border with Sudan, collect some equipment there, and 
sail back upriver. 
Shortly after leaving Melut, the LifeLine crew observed a major SPLA-iO installation on the western bank of the river, and several 
vessels and barges docked in front of it. One of these barges had a T-55 tank on it. There were approximately 1,500 rebel 
soldiers on the river bank, all of them armed, along with artillery and 
anti-aircraft guns. A speedboat with SPLA-iO troops onboard approached 
the LifeLine convoy and signaled for it to stop. Some of the SPLA-iO vessels 
were observed to have their engines run- ning, apparently ready to prevent the 
UN convoy from moving forward. The convoy slowed down and eventually 
had to stop. At that moment, all of the SPLA-iO troops pointed their weapons, 
including artillery, machine guns, and the tank gun, at the UN’s barges, and  
50 or 60 SPLA-iO soldiers came onboard the LifeLine convoy. The soldiers 
immediately started searching the UN barges and boats. Protests from the UN personnel had no effect. Later, the UN 
personnel, including military liaison officers, members of the Bangladeshi Force Marine Unit (BanFMU) Force Protection 
(FP) element, and crew members were taken ashore, disarmed, searched, interrogated, and placed in custody. 
Over the following three days, the SPLA-iO offloaded the LifeLine barges, seizing 55,000 liters of fuel, two machine guns, 
five AK-47 assault rifles, an inflatable boat, a generator, communication equipment, ammunition, and many other items 
belonging to the UN and its personnel. On 1 November, after days of negotiation with the local SPLA-iO leadership, the 
All of the SPLA-iO troops 
pointed their weapons, 
including artillery, machine 
guns, and the tank gun, 
at the UN’s barges.
UNPOL briefs Sector North Commander on the situation in the POC site in Bentiu, Unity State, January, 2016.
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barges, some of the boats, the UN personnel, and the crew 
were released. Though the SPLA-iO promised to return the 
seized UN property, equipment, and weapons, efforts to 
collect them have been fruitless. 
This incident illustrates the fact that UNMISS was oblivious 
to the SPLA-iO’s plans and that the knowledge it thought 
it had about the force was not enough. The episode could 
have been prevented had UNMISS had current intelligence 
on the SPLA-iO in Kaka. In fact, the Kaka incident is evi-
dence that the SPLA-iO has good knowledge of UNMISS, 
its personnel and forces, and its movement of goods. 
The concentration of SPLA-iO forces on the river and the 
disposition of its river crafts indicate that the SPLA-iO 
was prepared to intercept the LifeLine convoy and seize 
UNMISS goods, equipment, and weapons. 
UNMISS made a mistake by not conducting route recon-
naissance or checking the ground situation prior to the 
movement of its convoy. The use of imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) would possibly have detected the adversary’s 
forces and indicated their intentions. Also, a simple recon-
naissance of the sailing route by the BanFMU FP element 
would have been enough to prevent the LifeLine convoy 
from continuing its journey north of Melut. Ensuring 
safe movement of barges such as the LifeLine 14 is possible 
with proper intelligence, but as things are, it is possible 
that a similar incident will happen again in South Sudan. 
Therefore, it is highly recommended that UNMISS employ 
ISR—specifically IMINT—before and during this type of 
operation.
Crisis at the Malakal Protection of Civilians 
Site
UNMISS faced one of its toughest challenges when fighting 
broke out inside a UNMISS Protection of Civilians (PoC) 
site in Malakal on 17 February 2016. The PoC is located 
next to the UN base in Malakal, and prior to the fighting, it 
housed approximately 48,000 internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) who came from South Sudan’s three leading tribes, 
the Shilluks, Dinkas, and Nuers. A few Sudanese (Dar-
furian), Ugandan, Ethiopian, and Eritrean nationals also 
resided in the site, largely for commercial interests. Rela-
tions among the tribes and communities in the PoC were 
influenced by political, military, and security dynamics in 
the country, and they deteriorated whenever there were 
major political or security developments. The February 
2016 crisis in the Malakal PoC was a direct result of the 
South Sudan government’s decision to create new states. 
Sector North Commander visits Mongolian Battalion in Bentiu, Unity state, 2015.
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In October 2015, South Sudan’s President Kiir issued an 
executive decree that divided the country’s 10 states into 28 
smaller states. The former Upper Nile State was split into 
three states, which were to be populated mainly by specific 
tribes: Western Nile for the Shilluks, Eastern Nile for the 
Dinkas, and Latjor for the Nuers. The president’s decree 
and its implementation had a tremendous impact on the 
Malakal PoC residents. The creation of Eastern Nile State, 
which included Malakal and its environs, sharply increased 
tensions between the Dinkas and the Shilluks, who consid-
ered the region to be their ancestral land. This was as true 
within the PoC as outside it. The situation worsened further 
when the governor of Eastern Nile State, SPLA Lieutenant 
General Chol Thon Balok, an ethnic Dinka, issued an 
administrative order relieving all civil servants from non-
Dinka tribes of their positions across the state. The Shilluks 
decided to fight the Dinkas and preserve their land. 
Within the PoC, the Dinkas knew the Shilluks were deter-
mined to attack and got ready to fight back. Weapons and 
ammunition were covertly smuggled into the PoC. The 
situation was getting worse day by day. 
Tension between the Shilluks and Dinkas reached a 
boiling point on the night of 16 February 2016, after two 
Dinka SPLA soldiers in civilian clothes attempted to enter 
the PoC with AK-47 ammunition. Violence was about 
to erupt as crowds of angry youths from the two tribes 
gathered and stood facing each other, but the UNMISS’s 
Formed Police Unit (FPU) intervened and managed to 
prevent the outbreak of hostilities. The next evening, 
however, around 2230 local time, the youths came back 
with weapons—AK-47s, light machine guns, and hand 
grenades—and opened fire on each other. The fighting 
lasted 17 hours, with few interruptions, and it involved 
the active participation of government troops on the 
side of the Dinkas. The SPLA not only took part in the 
PoC fighting, but also sent troops to secure the Malakal 
Airport, deployed an infantry unit near the UNMISS 
base on the river bank where a BanFMU detachment was 
stationed, and assisted the Dinka IDPs with leaving the PoC 
for Malakal town before and during the fighting.6 UN-
MISS’s peacekeeping force responded on the afternoon of 
18 February, when more SPLA reinforcements entered the 
PoC to support the Dinkas. The peacekeepers conducted 
a deliberate assault on the Dinka militants and the SPLA 
soldiers, drove them out of the PoC, and secured the site. 
The incident took the lives of 34 IDPs and injured more 
than 100. Violence has not recurred in the Malakal PoC 
since the military intervention.
Sector North Commander reviews the honor guard of Mongolian Battalion in Bentiu, Unity state.
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Again, the crisis in the Malakal PoC site could have been prevented if UNMISS 
had been equipped with ISR capability. There were indications and warnings of 
the coming violence, such as shops closing, holes being cut into the PoC fencing 
for escape, and people getting ready to leave the site before the fighting, but these 
indicators were ignored. Some IDPs and humanitarian workers informed the UN 
police, FPU, UN Department of Safety and Security, and UNMISS’s Field Office 
in Malakal about the tensions among the IDPs and possible dangers, but that 
information was never shared with the peacekeeping forces. The UN agencies 
were reporting to their chains of command, but didn’t share their observations 
with one another. That was a mistake, one that is still being made. 
The UN Board of Inquiry and Special Investigation Team investigated the 
incident and later concluded that the peacekeeping force failed to react in time 
to the crisis in the PoC. It is true that there were a number of problems with the 
peacekeepers’ response, and they were clearly identified in Sector North’s After 
Action Report, which was shared with the UN investigators. Notwithstanding, 
the peacekeepers’ actions, although much criticized, saved the lives of thousands 
of Shilluk and Nuer IDPs who were—and still are—targeted, harassed, kidnaped, 
and sometimes murdered by South Sudan’s government force, the SPLA. The 
Malakal PoC incident in February 2016 was a result of UNMISS’s failure to foresee 
the growing danger of the situation. The crisis developed because UNMISS did 
not have the capability to collect information on unfolding events, make timely 
assessments, or share those assessments among its responsive sections.
The Juba Crisis
UNMISS failed to effectively deal with a crisis situation that developed in the 
capital city of Juba in July 2016. In fact, the crisis in Juba demonstrated how 
fragile the peace in South Sudan is, how weak security is for South Sudanese and 
The crisis developed 
because UNMISS did not 
have the capability to 
collect information on 
unfolding events, make 
timely assessments, or 
share those assessments.
The Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, El Ghassim Wane, visits  
Malakal, Upper Nile State, October 2016.
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foreigners alike, and how incapable UNMISS is of protecting civilians if violence 
breaks out in the country.
While on the way back to their base from former First Vice President Riek 
Machar’s residence on the evening of 7 July 2016, an SPLA-iO mounted patrol 
was stopped at a checkpoint manned by SPLA soldiers. Upon being threatened 
with disarmament and arrest, the patrol fired on the government soldiers, killing 
five and injuring several others, before escaping the scene. 
The next day, President Kiir and First Vice President Machar met at the Presi-
dential Palace to discuss the previous night’s incident and find ways to prevent 
the outbreak of any further hostilities in the city. During the meeting, however, 
a shoot-out occurred at the palace between government troops and forces loyal 
to the first vice president, and it quickly turned into full-blown fighting. The 
fighting spread to Jebel, Gudele, and other districts of Juba where SPLA-iO forces 
were stationed. On 9 July, the fighting intensified. The SPLA placed tanks and 
armored personnel carriers at every intersection and deployed small groups of 
soldiers in close proximity to each other on the streets of Juba. It also deployed 
ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks around the Juba International 
airport. The next day, the SPLA launched a large offensive against opposition 
cantonments, including Riek Machar’s residence, using T-72 tanks and MI-24 at-
tack helicopters. In four days of heavy fighting, the SPLA defeated the opposition 
forces and took control of the city. On 11 July, President Kiir declared a cease-
fire, but small-scale clashes continued in and around Juba in the following days. 
Opposition leader Machar withdrew from the city, and later fled the country. 
After the crisis, he was replaced by his associate Taban Deng Gai, who was sworn 
in as first vice president on 26 July 2016. 
The heavy fighting in Juba resulted in more than 300 deaths and many more 
injuries. Hundreds of women and girls, including members of international 
organizations, were raped by SPLA soldiers during the crisis. Tens of thousands 
of people fled to neighboring countries to seek safety. The UN bases in Juba 
were caught in the crossfire, targeted, and then attacked, during which two 
peacekeepers and one UN civilian employee lost their lives. Government soldiers 
looted the World Food Program’s storehouses in the capital city, and foreigners 
were targeted, robbed, beaten, and raped. During the crisis in Juba, UNMISS 
didn’t know where the enemy fire was coming from and didn’t attempt to locate 
and neutralize it. 
The UN strongly condemned the fighting, killing, looting, and rape, but it must 
ask, “What could UNMISS have done differently in the Juba crisis?” Could it 
have saved the lives of innocent civilians? Could it have deterred violence against 
women and girls and prevented them from being raped? Could it have protected 
its bases, humanitarian warehouses, and other property? The answer to 
these last three questions is yes. Had UNMISS troops been equipped with the 
right tools—namely, ISR—and had UNMISS leadership been provided with 
current and updated information, things would have been different. UNMISS 
wouldn’t have been able to stop the fighting, but it could have protected the 
peacekeeping mission, saved lives, and prevented looting, robberies, and rapes. 
The crisis in Juba 
demonstrated how fragile 
the peace in South Sudan 
is and how weak security 
is for South Sudanese 
and foreigners alike.
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The UN strongly condemned 
the fighting, killing, looting, 
and rape, but it must ask, 
“What could UNMISS 
have done differently 
in the Juba crisis?”
Conclusion
The three incidents described above occurred over a period of less than three 
years, and events like them are very likely to occur again in the future. An effective 
way to deal with similar circumstances is to equip UNMISS with an ISR capability.
UNMISS’s inability to manage crisis situations led the UN Security Council to re-
inforce the mission with 4,000 more troops in 2016. The additional troops, most 
of whom have not yet been deployed as of this writing, are intended to secure 
Juba, critical infrastructure, and UN bases and enhance the protection of civil-
ians. Raising the force level without proper equipment and weapons, however, is 
unlikely to improve the security situation in South Sudan. The larger force will 
face the same problems as the current UNMISS force—mainly, the restriction of 
movement. The restrictions on UNMISS’s ground, air, and riverine movements, im-
posed by both the SPLA and the SPLA-iO, are hampering the successful execution 
of the mission’s tasks, and ultimately, the ability of the peacekeepers to imple-
ment the UN mandate. An effective way to deal with movement restrictions is 
to equip UNMISS with an ISR capability. An ISR capability in support of civilian, 
military, and police components would better enable UNMISS to prepare for 
or avoid potential adversarial actions than will the deployment of additional 
troops.  v
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Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations Interviewed by MAJ Anders Hamlin,  
US Army Special Forces
This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 21 March 2018, noted military historian 
Max Boot visited the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, Cali-
fornia, where he and Major Anders Hamlin discussed Boot’s recently published 
biography of Edward Lansdale and the legacy of Lansdale’s efforts to establish 
and support stable governments in the Philippines and Vietnam between 1950 
and 1957.2 
Anders HAMLIN: Your previous books covered subjects such as America’s his-
tory of involvement in small wars, the history of guerilla warfare, and the impact 
of technological change on war and society. The Road Not Taken is your first 
biography.3 Students of Edward Lansdale have access to his memoirs, along with 
Cecil Currey’s biography and a number of other works that touch on Lansdale’s 
career and legacy.4 What does The Road Not Taken bring to the table? 
Max BOOT: There is a lot of new research in this book that other people did not 
have access to, including the love letters that Ed Lansdale wrote to Pat Kelly, his 
longtime mistress, who eventually became his second wife. These were previously 
unavailable to any scholar. The letters that Lansdale was writing, often simulta-
neously, to his first wife, Helen, were also unavailable until I acquired them from 
family members. Some new documents have been declassified only in the last 
couple of years. So, together, all of this enabled me to offer the fullest and most 
in-depth portrait of Ed Lansdale and his storied career, which really goes beyond 
a lot of the myths and clichés and legends that have grown up around him over 
the decades. The new material enabled me to tell his story and have access to his 
innermost thinking in a way that previous authors have not had, and I put it all 
into the context of the most recent scholarship on the Vietnam War. So I think 
this is the most in-depth and most up-to-date treatment of Ed Lansdale that you 
are going to see anywhere. 
HAMLIN: What made you choose to write about Ed Lansdale, especially in the 
Vietnam context?
BOOT: I was initially fascinated by Lansdale years ago, when I met one of his 
closest collaborators in New York, Rufus Phillips. Rufus was a wonderful guy. 
He joined the CIA right out of Yale and was sent to Saigon in 1954, where he 
went to work for Ed Lansdale and became one of his closest colleagues and 
friends. Rufus is now in his mid-80s and lives with his wife in northern Virginia. 
I wrote a couple of chapters about Lansdale in my last book, Invisible Armies.5 
My editor and I were talking about what I should do for an encore, and he 
suggested writing about Lansdale. I was initially skeptical, but I am very glad 
that he convinced me to do it, because there was a lot of new material there and 
a fascinating story. Getting this deep into the material made me realize how 
superficial a lot of the previous writing on him has actually been. So I think I 
bring a new perspective to the table. 
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HAMLIN: How did your perspective change as you moved from writing about 
him as part of a case study in your previous work to writing a whole book about 
him? 
BOOT: That’s a great question. I learned a lot more about him, and I gained both 
a greater appreciation for some of those insights and a greater understanding 
of his limitations. You see both of those in the course of the book. I learned 
about the extent to which he immersed himself in local society and how hard he 
tried to learn about the culture that he was in, as a prelude to becoming an 
effective counterinsurgent or an effective operative in the realms of psychological 
and political warfare. But I also learned a lot about his limitations. He had a 
tendency to alienate his superiors. He clashed with various bureaucratic foes, 
often in ways that were ultimately counterproductive. There are a lot of episodes 
that I didn’t write about at all in my previous book, including his involvement 
in Operation Mongoose to overthrow or kill Fidel Castro, which I detail pretty 
closely in this book. 
HAMLIN: In the Philippines, Lansdale had an ideal partner in Ramon Mag-
saysay and faced an insurgency generally isolated on the island of Luzon. How 
much of Lansdale’s famous success in the Philippines was a function of those 
fortunate circumstances?
BOOT: There is no question that circumstances were much more favorable 
for Lansdale in the Philippines than they were subsequently in Vietnam, but 
remember, it’s always easy to conclude in hindsight that things would have 
worked out because they did work out. But when Lansdale went back to the 
Philippines on a second tour in 1950, the situation looked pretty dire, and many 
in the US government assumed that the Philippines could fall to the Huks—the 
communist insurgents—at any time. So I would push back on the notion that 
it was an easy situation or that success was foreordained. There is no question, 
however, that because the insurgents lacked outside support, and because 
Lansdale was working within a culture that he understood very well, and because 
he had a protégé and partner in the very charismatic and successful politician 
Ramon Magsaysay, he found much more favorable terrain for his operations in 
the Philippines than he would subsequently in Vietnam. 
In Vietnam, he was dealing with a state that was next door to the enemy and 
an insurgency that received growing amounts of support from North Vietnam. 
Initially, he also faced a lot of problems in Vietnam with the French, who were 
supporting various political and religious sects against the central government. 
And the man he had to work with, Ngo Dinh Diem, was far from charismatic—a 
reclusive scholarly guy who was authoritarian by disposition. Lansdale also didn’t 
speak any language but English and had to communicate with Diem through 
a translator. All of that makes what he was able to achieve in the next couple of 
years even more impressive in some ways, because he did manage to set up the 
state of South Vietnam in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. When 
he left Vietnam at the end of 1956, the new state appeared to be on a fairly solid 
footing. His achievement was not destined to endure, but I think what he tried to 
forge in South Vietnam might have been more lasting if he had been allowed to 





HAMLIN: John Paul Vann is perhaps even more famous than Lansdale as the 
archetypal American advisor in Vietnam. Vann considered Lansdale to be a hero, 
but by 1972, Vann was coordinating B-52 strikes and fighting the type of war that 
Lansdale had sought to avoid. Was John Paul Vann the anti-Lansdale?
BOOT: No, I wouldn’t say he was the anti-Lansdale. They were friends and saw 
eye to eye on a lot of things. Both of them opposed a heavy-handed use of force 
to put down an insurgency. I would say that Vann was more focused on the 
purely military sphere of operations, whereas Lansdale was much more focused 
on politics. During the Easter Offensive, Vann and other US advisors did a 
tremendous job of bolstering the the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 
by calling in air strikes that enabled the South Vietnamese to repel the North 
Vietnamese invasion.6 In some ways, I think that Vann and the other US advisors 
were making up for the weaknesses of the ARVN’s leadership—factionalism, 
corruption, and favoritism. The critical contribution that Vann and other advi-
sors made in 1972 was to backstop the ARVN officer corps and essentially step 
in when ARVN officers didn’t get the job done. The American officers stepped 
forward and provided very effective leadership to the ARVN troops and also, of 
course, very effective liaison work with American air power. If we had managed 
to keep 5,000 advisors and air power on call after the Paris Peace Accords in 
1973, South Vietnam might have continued to exist. I think the role that Vann 
and the other advisors played was a critical one in 1972. 
What Lansdale tried to forge 
in South Vietnam might have 
been more lasting if he had 
been allowed to go back and 
continue working with Diem.
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HAMLIN: In The Road Not Taken, you quote Rufus Phillips saying about 
Lansdale, “We shall not see his like again, but his ideas shall never die.” Do you 
think that this is true? Is it possible that Lansdale’s ideas, if not dead, have been 
forgotten in some ways?
BOOT: His ideas continue to live to some extent—I certainly hope that I 
am keeping them alive and introducing them to a new generation. Lansdale 
handicapped himself because he did not set out his methods in a very persuasive 
format, in the way that T.E. Lawrence, David Galula, and other writers did.7 As a 
result, these strategists became more influential because people can consult their 
writings today. I have tried to make up for that gap with this book, by laying out 
his life and how some of his ideas might have salience today. Although Lansdale 
was not cited in the Army/Marine COIN Manual, General David Petraeus 
[commander, US forces in Iraq] was certainly aware of his ideas, and Lansdale’s 
approach to politics, above all, certainly played a role in the [2007 Iraq troop] 
surge. I think his ideas are the basis of modern COIN 101, but now there is a bit of 
a disconnect between COIN theory and actual COIN practice. In COIN practice, 
we tend to concentrate a lot of resources on leadership targeting, the targeting 
of terrorist groups, using decapitation strategies—killing insurgents rather than 
trying to pursue a favorable political 
end state, which is what Lansdale was 
all about. Of course, we do that because 
it’s much easier. We know how to do 
leadership targeting. We have a lot of 
trouble doing the politics, so we default 
to killing insurgents in the hope that 
this strategy will kill the insurgency, 
and we are usually disappointed. We are 
constantly forced to confront the truths 
that Lansdale put out there: it’s not 
enough to kill insurgents, you have to 
offer a better alternative. I think that’s 
the biggest challenge we face in the war 
on terrorism, just as it was the biggest 
challenge that the United States faced 
battling communist insurgencies in 
places like the Philippines and Vietnam. 
HAMLIN: Who are the Lansdales of 
today, those who know the answers and 
should be listened to? 
BOOT: That’s a great question. There 
certainly are some SOF operators, FAOs 
[foreign area officers], and advisors 
who have spent some time out there. 
There are also various civilian experts 
such as, for example, Carter Malkasian, 
a historian who worked with the 
Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan; and 
Sarah Chayes, a former National Public 
Radio reporter who lived in Kandahar 
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for years and worked with the US command in Afghanistan. These are people 
who have that very specific, on-the-ground knowledge that Lansdale possessed. 
But the challenge is similar to the challenge that Lansdale faced: how do you 
translate these insights into the Washington policy process? How do you make 
people in Washington pay attention to what you know—what you are learning 
on the ground? I think that, in many ways, that’s the biggest challenge that these 
latter-day Lansdales confront. 
HAMLIN: The Philippines are still troubled by the communist New People’s 
Army in the north and of course, by various Islamist terrorists and insurgents in 
the south. What would Lansdale do if he were advising the Philippine govern-
ment today? 
BOOT: That would be a tall order, because I think it would be very hard to make 
[Philippines president] Rodrigo Duterte listen to anybody, much less an Amer-
ican. But I think what Lansdale would certainly do is focus on the government 
and try to link the government with the people to address people’s needs. That’s 
not happening because Duterte is pursuing a strongman strategy of sending out 
vigilantes to kill supposed drug dealers. In some ways, it’s a little reminiscent of 
[former Philippines president] Ferdinand Marcos, whom Duterte greatly ad-
mires. Lansdale was not in the Philippines by the time Marcos declared martial 
law in the early 1970s and became a dictator. Lansdale was retired and back in 
Washington, but he still had a lot of friends in the Philippines, and they were 
telling him, “This guy Marcos is going to come to grips with the insurgency; he 
is going to impose law and order and crack down on crime, so it will be a great 
thing.” Lansdale was very skeptical because he was concerned that Marcos would 
become a self-serving strongman. Of course, those fears were amply vindicated.
Lansdale would probably have a very similar concern about Duterte today, who 
is also this wannabe strongman who cracks down on insurgents and crime and 
so forth. But he is going about it in such a heavy-handed fashion that it’s almost 
certain to backfire. Under his direction, the Philippine army has used massive 
force to try to defeat ISIS offshoots in the southern Philippine islands with some 
limited success, but I don’t think this policy is actually going to bring lasting 
peace. I believe that the fundamental reason you have insurgencies is bad govern-
ment. The countries that are well governed don’t have insurgencies. Nobody wor-
ries about an insurgency in Switzerland. But in the Philippines, as long as you 
have this bad government, you are going to have insurgencies, whether they’re 
Islamic, or communist, or what have you. 
HAMLIN: What would Lansdale suggest for Afghanistan in 2018?
BOOT: Again, I suspect that Lansdale would focus on trying to make the 
Afghan government less corrupt, more accountable, and more effective, and he 
would work closely with the leadership in Kabul to try to achieve those aims. I 
think one of the big failures in our Afghanistan policy is that we became alien-
ated from our ally [former president] Hamid Karzai, just as we became alienated 
from our Vietnamese ally Ngo Dinh Diem in the early 1960s. We were at logger-
heads with Karzai, and we didn’t have anybody on our side who could influence 
him in a positive direction, at least not after [Zalmay] Khalilzad stepped down 
[as US ambassador to Afghanistan]. So I think Lansdale would have focused on 
trying to find somebody who could work very closely with [Afghan president] 
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Ashraf Ghani in a supportive fashion and help align the 
efforts of the US and Afghan governments so that we don’t 
wind up at loggerheads again. I think Lansdale would 
probably be cheered by some of Ghani’s attempts to crack 
down on corruption and put some corrupt generals and 
officials on trial. He would want to put the US govern-
ment behind those efforts, and he would probably be 
dismayed to see that other branches of the US government 
are often working at odds with that focus on corruption. 
The CIA and others, including Special Operations Forces, 
have basically hired their own private Afghan armies. That 
has achieved some immediate tactical effects against the 
Taliban, but it also comes at a cost of fostering corruption 
and warlordism, and undermining the authority of the 
central governments. Lansdale would be concerned about 
some of those developments and would want to focus 
more on trying to increase people’s faith in the govern-
ment, this being the ultimate route by which to defeat the 
Taliban. 
HAMLIN: In your book War Made 
New, you touched on the growing 
proliferation of UAVs, unmanned aerial 
vehicles.8 In the years since that book 
was written, we have come to rely more 
and more on these and other high-tech 
tools for prosecuting our counterin-
surgency and counterterrorist campaigns. What would 
Lansdale say about this reliance and about the associated 
focus on leadership targeting?
BOOT: Oh, Lansdale would be very skeptical about trying 
to find technological solutions to fundamentally human 
problems. This reminds me of his encounter with [then-
US secretary of defense] Robert McNamara in, I think, 
1962. McNamara called him into his office and asked for 
his help in trying to computerize the Vietnam War, to 
reduce everything down to a matter of numbers and cal-
culations that could be fed into a computer. Lansdale said 
to him, “Well, that’s great, Mr. Secretary, but don’t lose 
sight of the X factor.” McNamara began to write “X factor” 
on his graph paper and asked, “What is that?” Lansdale 
said, “That’s something that can’t actually be calculated. 
It’s the feelings of the people. It’s the sentiments of the 
people about whom they want to be governed by. That’s 
ultimately going to determine the course of this conflict.” 
I think it’s important to keep that insight in mind today, 
because the reason why these Islamist terrorist groups 
find a foothold among various populations, whether it’s 
the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, the Sunnis in Iraq or Syria, 
or groups in Somalia, Libya, and Nigeria—in so many 
other places—is because the government is alienating 
some substantial sector of its own population. That’s not a 
problem you are going to kill your way out of. 
To move away from channeling Lansdale for a second 
and give my own view, I would say that drone strikes and 
the use of drones for ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance] and all of this other stuff is useful. I am 
not saying we shouldn’t do it, but it’s not the solution, and 
we’re fooling ourselves if we think it is. It can be part of an 
integrated strategy, but it should not be the whole strategy. 
Drones are used for everything these days, including a lot 
of ISR, but if you are talking about kinetic drone strikes, 
with Reapers and stuff like that, that’s basically a version 
of what JSOC [ Joint Special Operations Command] has 
been doing since 2001. Remember that JSOC became the 
world’s greatest manhunting machine under [former JSOC 
commanding general Stanley] McChrystal.
 JSOC killed a lot of people in Iraq 
between 2003 and 2006—a lot of 
people who deserved killing—but 
the decapitation strategy didn’t really 
achieve any larger strategic affect. At 
most, it can achieve some short-term 
tactical effects, disrupt some terrorist 
operations, which could be a good 
thing, but it certainly is not going to 
defeat the insurgents. You are basically mowing the lawn. 
You didn’t see violence actually start to come down until 
the surge in 2007–2008, when General Petraeus imple-
mented a much more comprehensive counterinsurgency 
strategy, of which leadership targeting was one aspect. 
You also had political aspects and providing security to 
the people—there was a lot more going on. 
HAMLIN: Earlier, you mentioned that the difficulty that 
modern Lansdales face is translating their expertise and 
ideas into the policy process. You also mentioned that 
Lansdale’s biggest limitation was in clashing with the 
bureaucracy and alienating supporters. To what extent is 
this an internal bureaucratic problem? 
BOOT: Well, it is a long-lasting problem. In some ways, 
Lansdale’s travails mirror those of T.E. Lawrence, who was 
very successful at winning over the Bedouin tribesmen, 
but not so successful at winning over the statesmen in 
Whitehall. Lawrence was very frustrated by the results of 
the post–World War I peace settlement, which undid a lot 
of what he was trying to achieve in terms of fostering Arab 
independence. Instead, of course, the French and British 
governments carved up the Middle East between them 
into new colonies. So I think there are a lot of similarities 
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with Lansdale, who achieved some success on the ground but then was stymied 
because he was ultimately ignored by the powers that be in Washington, who 
went ahead with the Diem coup in 1963 against his advice. Also against his 
advice, they Americanized the war effort, sent in vast numbers of troops, tried 
to bomb the North into submission—they did all of these things that Lansdale 
warned would not work. So I think this is an enduring problem. It’s especially 
tough because kinetic actions brief so well. When I was sitting in on some of 
these battle update assessments in Baghdad and Kabul, every morning the 
commander would be briefed on the JSOC “jackpots” of the previous night: here 
is the bad guy they took down. That’s an obvious metric of success that briefs 
well. Things like key leader engagements are just not as sexy because this work of 
trying to build a long-term relationship doesn’t necessarily produce immediate 
results. Trying to influence local leaders is important and people recognize that, 
but again, it doesn’t translate into an obvious metric of success. So I think there 
is always a tendency to fall for the sexier kinetic approach and to neglect the 
unsexy, long-term, often frustrating work of building up these relationships that 
ultimately may prove more important in defeating the insurgency. 
HAMLIN: Your books Savage Wars of Peace and Invisible Armies look respec-
tively at American experiences with small wars and the history of guerillas, 
terrorists, insurgents, and counterinsurgents.9 As we approach 18 years of involve-
ment in Afghanistan, what historical lessons are most applicable for Special 
Operations and conventional forces serving in Afghanistan, and for policy 
makers in Washington?
BOOT: The first lesson that jumps out at me is the historical importance of 
cross-border sanctuaries for determining the failure or success of any insurgency. 
In the case of Afghanistan, the support the Taliban receive from Pakistan makes 
it virtually impossible to defeat them, and certainly impossible with the levels 
of force that we have in Afghanistan. That’s going to remain an eternal source 
of frustration because I don’t think that cross-border support is going to change 
anytime soon. The government of Pakistan isn’t going to give up on the Taliban. 
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Other forces that contribute to the success of the Taliban have to do with the 
corruption and brutality of the Afghan government and the warlords who are 
aligned with it. Again, that’s part of the historic norm, because insurgencies 
flourish when governments are dishonest, corrupt, and abusive, and lose the 
support of the people. I think most Afghans support their own government, but 
there is a substantial minority, concentrated especially in Pashtun areas in the 
south and east, who don’t. The ineptitude of the government and the prevalence 
of cross-border sanctuaries are the two most important factors that have shaped 
the war in Afghanistan. US troops have done the best they could, but they could 
not overcome these huge adversities. 
HAMLIN: How do you think the United States should engage with the world 
over the next 10 years? How should we use the elements of our national power, 
especially with respect to peer competitors like Russia and China?
BOOT: Lansdale actually offers a pretty decent model of how to interact with 
the rest of the world. He tried to interact empathetically, sympathetically with 
foreigners, and treated people with respect and dignity. Those are good hall-
marks of the way we should conduct ourselves. Unfortunately, I don’t think [US] 
President [Donald] Trump understands the importance of soft power, but soft 
power has been the secret sauce of American foreign policy. The United States is 
the richest country and has the most powerful military, but our military is still 
outnumbered by all of the other militaries in the world. If we had been a threat-
ening, aggressive power like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union or Napoleonic 
France, we would have seen a big coalition of states ganging up to contain and 
eventually bring us down. That hasn’t happened because we have been a relatively 
benign power. There is a coalition of states that is against us, but we also have 
allies all over the world, far more than do countries like China and Russia, which 
are very threatening to their neighbors and have almost no real friends. We have 
a lot of real friends, and I think that is truly the secret of American success in 
the world: we are able to mobilize this huge free-world coalition of like-minded 
states. My concern is that we fritter that away with this “America First” foreign 
policy, which I think needlessly alienates the rest of the world and undermines 
America’s core strengths as a country that stands for human freedom and dignity, 
in the way that Lansdale did. I suggest that we should continue the approach 
that American policy makers have taken since 1945: being relatively benign in 
our approach to the world, not taking full advantage of any relationship, trans-
forming former foes into friends, defending democracies, promoting free trade, 
and standing for democratic freedom—all of these things that our country is all 
about. I think they have stood us in great stead all around the world, and I hope 
they remain the defining characteristics of American foreign policy. 
HAMLIN: Where do you think Lansdale’s legacy is most felt? In the CIA? The 
Air Force? Special Operations? 
BOOT: I don’t think he left a lasting imprint on the CIA or the Air Force, 
because he was such an outlier in both organizations. In some ways, his legacy 
may be most alive in the Special Forces, because one of his bureaucratic successes 
in the late 1950s or early 60s was in convincing the Special Forces to take on the 
counterinsurgency mission, which, of course, remains a hallmark of the SOF to 
this day. A lot of the thinking on counterinsurgency—COIN 101 these days—is 
based on concepts that Lansdale developed in the early 1950s and which he 
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relentlessly promoted from the late 1950s on. Some of the things that he taught 
endure to this present day, primarily within the Army and Marine Corps, which 
are the two services that are most focused on counterinsurgency. But what he 
was teaching about the importance of politics and political advising and working 
with foreign leaders—that aspect of his teaching is largely neglected. It’s a posi-
tive development that the Army is standing up these security forces assistance 
brigades, because that’s in the Lansdalian vein: recognizing the importance of 
advise-and-assist missions to promote our security interests. But there is not re-
ally a comparable effort on the political/civilian side of advising. That remains a 
gap in US capabilities, and we could learn something from Lansdale’s day. I think 
that in today’s war on terror, we could really use an army of Lansdales out there, 
but they don’t exist. 
HAMLIN: What advice do you have for Special Operations officers here at NPS 
who are preparing to return to the force? 
BOOT: I would focus on two pieces of advice. The most potent weapon system 
you are ever going to possess is the one between your ears. The more I read and 
learn about the history of warfare, the more I am convinced that there is nothing 
more powerful than a good idea. You have to think your way to victory before 
you can achieve actual victory on the battlefield. The military tends to place a lot 
of emphasis on the martial virtues of strength and bravery and that kind of stuff, 
and obviously those are important, but at the end of the day, the most important 
attribute is being smart and savvy—that ultimately trumps everything else. If 
you look at the success that Ed Lansdale enjoyed, it wasn’t because he was a crack 
shot or good at martial arts or anything like that. As far as I know, he never killed 
an enemy in battle, but he managed to achieve a lot of national security objec-
tives just by thinking about war in a different way. So that’s a big lesson. 
The second lesson, again drawing from Lansdale’s experience, is about the pri-
vacy of politics. I assume that everybody reading this knows the famous dictum 
from [military strategist Carl von] Clausewitz about war being a continuation 
of politics by other means. It’s one thing to hear that, and it’s another thing to 
internalize it and really grasp what that means in practice. Too often, we treat 
warfare as an engineering exercise, a targeting exercise, a technical exercise: put-
ting steel on target and eliminating enemies of one kind or another. We forget 
that, ultimately, what counts is building up a political system. We should keep 
in mind that in the past, whenever we’ve failed in the political realm, we have 
squandered whatever gains we won on the battlefield, whether it was in World 
War I, or more recently in places like Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq. That’s a lesson that 
we should have learned time and time again. On the home front, the military is 
supposed to be non-partisan, and abroad they feel that politics isn’t really their 
job; the State Department or somebody else should step in and do it. But as I am 
sure you realize, when you look behind you, increasingly, you don’t see anybody 
there. So, if the military doesn’t focus on the politics of whatever country it is 
deployed to, more often than not, nobody else is going to do it either. It’s going 
to be a vacuum that gets filled by our enemies. Effective political engagement is 
imperative. 
One of Lansdale’s insights was that the US military has a huge political impact 
wherever it goes because we bring all of these resources and troops, and we have 
a huge impact on local society. But most of the time we don’t realize it—we are 
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mindless about it. You have certainly seen that in the cases of Iraq and Afghani-
stan, where we constantly empower certain factions of society and disempower 
others. It’s often done with tiny stupid little things we didn’t even think about, 
like giving out contracts to provide concrete for blast barriers for our bases. We 
don’t normally think about who is going to provide that concrete and whom is 
he aligned with politically. Where is the money going to go? Is it going to fuel 
corruption? You have to do a deep level of analysis to even begin to understand 
the political impact that you are having on a society, but most of the time we 
don’t do that. So that would be my final bit of advice: think about the political 
impact that you have when you engage. That’s crucially important.  v
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This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 12 September 2016, Reza Marashi, 
research director at the National Iranian American Council, visited the US 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. Dr. Doug Borer of 
the Defense Analysis Department at NPS spoke with Marashi about the then-
recently concluded multilateral agreement to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, 
Iran’s tactics in the Persian Gulf, and the role of Hezbollah and Iran in Syria.2 
Although this interview took place over a year ago, the discussion remains fresh 
and relevant to the present geostrategic situation, particularly as the current US 
administration considers abrogating the Iran nuclear deal.
Doug BORER: I want to start by talking about a bit of news that came out 
recently concerning the release of some of the American prisoners who were in 
Iranian jails and the supposed payments that were made for them.3 What is your 
view on the importance of that news? 
Reza MARASHI: The Iranian government’s imprisonment of dual nationals—
people who hold citizenship in both Iran and the United States or Europe—has 
long been a problem. But let’s focus on American citizens. This is a problem 
that’s been going on for over three decades now. What separates this specific 
instance from incidents in the past is that the United States now has channels of 
communication with Iran that we haven’t had in more than 30 years. So, we were 
able to directly discuss with the Iranians potential ways to resolve the current 
problem. After much deliberation and much discussion, we were able to reach 
an arrangement by which Iranian citizens in American prisons were swapped for 
American citizens in Iranian prisons. 
Naturally, there is going to be a big to-do about this. There is a to-do about 
anything Iran-related that is not confrontational, because Iran is 
politically toxic in the United States. As we were negotiating the 
prisoner swap with Iran, we also had a claims tribunal going forward 
in The Hague. Before the 1979 revolution, the Iranian government 
had given the United States money to make purchases from the 
Department of Defense. Once the revolution happened, the United 
States obviously was not going to give the revolutionary government 
the weapons or the money, so the money had been sitting in the 
United States since 1979. The tribunal in The Hague was set up as 
part of the process of resolving the earlier Iranian hostage crisis—
getting our people who were trapped in the US embassy from 1979 to 
1981 out.4 So setting up this tribunal was part of that process, and the 
money was one of those claims. 
This money that the Iranian government had in the United States 
was in the process of being adjudicated, and the United States was 
going to lose big, to the tune of about $10 billion. Now, if you are the 
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US government, regardless of your political affiliation—Republican or Demo-
crat or anything in between—if you find out that you are about to lose $10 
billion, wouldn’t you try to settle for less? Wouldn’t you try to settle bilaterally 
with the Iranians so that you avoid having The Hague tribunal render a resolu-
tion that is not favorable to the American national interest? That’s exactly what 
we did. We contacted the Iranians in a track that was separate from the prisoner 
swap, and said, “Hey, why don’t we settle this claim? We will give you back your 
money with interest.” The Iranians said okay, and at that point we were just 
haggling over the price. But we were very concerned that the Iranians would 
pull the plug at the last minute, so we offered to settle on a number: about $1.7 
billion. We said, “We will give the money to you, but we want the prisoners 
out first.” That’s how it happened. There were some less-than-honest arguments 
calling this ransom.5 Well, no. If anything, it was the other way around. We 
were holding the leverage over the Iranians. The Iranians didn’t say, “Give us 
this money, or we won’t give you back your prisoners.” We were telling the 
Iranians, “Let our people out and then we will give you the money.” It was nego-
tiated on a separate track from the hostage talks. If people want to argue that 
the optics didn’t look good, I will say, fair enough. But then I will follow that up 
by saying that nothing looks good in terms of the political optics pertaining to 
Iran. 
BORER: I think that gets back to the broader, more strategically important 
nuclear deal that was agreed to several months ago.6 What do you think has been 
the outcome of that, for the broader relationship between Iran and the United 
States? As critics might ask, has this nuclear deal and the transfer of money 
Americans protest Iran’s hostage-taking in 1979.
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actually had any impact on Iran’s outreach to Hezbollah 
and the Houthi rebels, and other regional concerns?
MARASHI: It’s a great question. If you were to talk to 
US and Iranian officials, or officials from any of the other 
countries that were party to the negotiations over the 
nuclear deal, they would all tell you that this was strictly 
about Iran’s nuclear program. This was not about Iran’s 
regional policies, US-Iranian relations, or anything else. 
They would say it was strictly transactional. It was not 
meant to be transformational in terms of the broader 
relationship between the United States and Iran. I would 
answer that by saying, fair enough, but I don’t buy it. It 
wasn’t supposed to change everything in one fell swoop, 
but it certainly laid the groundwork so that, if implemen-
tation of this deal was faithfully carried out by both sides, 
it could serve as a foundation from which additional and 
subsequent discussions over other issues of contention 
could potentially grow. 
Based on assessments by the US government, the other 
governments that were party to this negotiation—the 
British, French, Germans, Chinese, and 
Russians—and also the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, we know that 
Iran has verifiably fulfilled its end of the 
bargain. This means that every aspect 
of Iran’s nuclear program—the entire 
supply chain from beginning to end—is 
being fully monitored and verified. So if 
Iran sneezes in its nuclear facilities, we know. That’s good. 
We didn’t have that kind of vision on the inside until this 
point. To attempt to build a nuclear weapon now, Iran 
would have to create an entire parallel supply chain, which 
has never been done in the history of the world. So, on 
nonproliferation, we are good. 
Where we are struggling, believe it or not, is in providing 
Iran with the sanctions relief that was promised under 
the terms of this deal. Let me unpack that for you. The 
United States made very specific commitments that are 
outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or 
JCPOA. Anybody can read it online.7 Have we fulfilled 
all of the specific obligations? Yes, we have. But there is a 
kicker. Very specific language in the JCPOA says that if Iran 
does not derive the economic benefit that was promised 
as a result of the sanctions relief outlined in this deal, the 
United States and Iran will work together to find mutu-
ally agreed upon additional steps that the United States 
will take to provide sanctions relief. Iran has not derived 
the economic benefit that was promised. So, the disagree-
ment between the countries lies in what additional steps 
the United States has to take to provide the sanctions 
relief that was promised. 
BORER: Do you think that is simply a matter of the price 
of oil?
MARASHI: I actually think it has nothing to do with oil. 
I think it has to do with the fact that the United States 
has unilateral sanctions that prevent Iran from conducting 
financial transactions in banks across the world. We have 
gone around the world and said that if banks process 
Iranian financial transactions, we will sanction and fine 
them. When you add it all up, we have fined banks around 
the world to the tune of millions, if not billions, of dollars. 
So banks are unwilling to process fully legitimate Iranian 
financial transactions, even on humanitarian goods, for 
example, because they don’t want to be penalized. So the 
banks are saying to the US government, “Provide a clear 
framework for what is permissible and what is not. We 
want a grandfather clause to say that if we do transactions 
that are legitimate today, in 2016, and—God forbid—the 
nuclear deal falls apart, you won’t retroactively punish us 
for doing business that was legitimate at 
the time.” The US government has not 
yet provided that kind of guidance and, 
frankly, the reason is because we are in 
an election year, and it is politically very 
difficult to provide additional benefits 
to Iran on anything, even though we 
are obligated to do so under the JCPOA. 
The Iranians could be making a much bigger stink about 
this, but they also have domestic politics, and if they say 
the deal isn’t working, that raises the political temperature 
on them. 
BORER: Do you think that the momentum for this deal 
will maintain itself no matter which of the two major 
party candidates wins the US election, or do you think it 
would be different under a President Hillary Clinton or a 
President Donald Trump?
MARASHI: I don’t think either one is going to scrap the 
deal. It is not in the American national interest to scrap a 
deal that every other major powerful country in the world 
has agreed to. It would adversely affect the American na-
tional interest to go back on a deal that we agreed to, not 
just with the Iranians, but with the French, the British, the 
Germans, the Russians, and the Chinese. That would raise 
questions about US credibility. So we have to be cognizant 
of not allowing our own domestic politics to impede our 
ability to carry out hefty and difficult multilateral arrange-
ments and agreements. 
Every aspect of Iran’s 
nuclear program is being 
fully monitored and verified. 
So if Iran sneezes in its 
nuclear facilities, we know.
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Now, that being said, what might be different if Trump were president? On the 
one hand, he says we should be doing business with Iran, selling airplanes and 
doing oil business with them, and he asks why the Europeans and the Asians are 
getting all of the money and the contracts. But on the other hand, he says the 
deal is terrible and that he won’t be beholden to it should he become president. 
So it’s hard to nail him down, but oftentimes a president is only as smart as the 
advisors that he or she surrounds themselves with. Most of Trump’s foreign 
policy advisors are the same cast of characters that President George W. Bush 
had surrounding him. Their policies in the Middle East are pretty clear. So I 
think his policies in the Middle East will more closely resemble those of George 
W. Bush than those of Barack Obama, George H.W. Bush, or Bill Clinton. 
I don’t think that there has been any particular damage to American power or 
credibility as a result of the Iran nuclear deal. In fact, I think they have been 
enhanced because the deal averted a military confrontation with Iran that 
nobody wanted. I don’t think we have sacrificed any leverage. I don’t think we 
have sacrificed any option with regard to checking Iranian ambition or Iranian 
power that is adversely affecting the interests of the United States. If anything, 
diplomacy without the military is like an orchestra without the instruments. But 
I think most levelheaded people would agree that military force should be the 
last resort. I think it’s less than honest to say that we have truly run the course 
with regard to diplomacy in Iran. I think there is a lot more we can do to have 
discussions, to test the seriousness and the intentions of this Iranian government 
to resolve problems peacefully. 
BORER: There has been news recently about swarms of small Iranian boats 
seeming to challenge or harass US boats in the Persian Gulf.8 Does that behavior 
come from divisions inside the Iranian military establishment, or are some 
commanders a little more free with the rules of engagement? Or do you think 
that these tactics are part of a strategic direction that comes from the top of the 
Iranian defense establishment? 
MARASHI: That’s an important question. I think it’s a little bit of both. I don’t 
think it’s a secret to anyone that the Iranian government does a lot of things 
in the Persian Gulf that we don’t like. 
We do a lot of things in the Persian 
Gulf that the Iranians don’t like. The 
question then is, what do we do about 
the things we don’t like? We don’t have 
an Incidents at Sea Agreement with 
the Iranian government, which is crazy 
to me, because we have very legitimate 
concerns about their behavior in the 
Persian Gulf, such as those tactics you 
outlined.9 But we don’t have the po-
litical courage in Washington, D.C., to 
propose it to them. I think the United 
States and the American national 
interest benefit from demonstrating 
that the problem is in Tehran, not in 
Washington. Demonstrate a willing-
ness to sit down and discuss it with 
I think it’s less than honest 
to say that we have truly 
run the course with regard 
to diplomacy in Iran.
Iranian Revolutionary Guard stages a 
re-creation of the arrest of American 
soldiers, 22 February 2016.
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the Iranian government—have a very 
difficult and oftentimes tense discus-
sion over what the rules of engagement 
should be and try to find ways to resolve 
problems peacefully. I think it’s frankly 
in Iran’s interest, as well, to have such 
an agreement because they don’t want a 
military confrontation with the United 
States. 
But the question is, if they don’t want a 
confrontation, why are they doing these 
provocative things? I like to say that all 
politics is local. So I do think that while 
Iranian military speedboats coming 
up against our big boys in the Persian 
Gulf is destabilizing, it also doesn’t have 
approval from the very top of the food 
chain in Iran’s political pecking order. I think that the Revolutionary Guard, 
who are the ones doing this maneuver in the Gulf, are freelancing a little bit. The 
reason why you have seen them do more of it over the past few weeks is twofold. 
First, I think they are trying to demonstrate internally, inside of Iran’s political 
system, that they are still here: “You [Iranian politicians] have to deal with us 
internally, but also you, the United States, have to deal with us externally. You 
can’t work around us.” Also, they think we are in their part of the world, in their 
waters. So they want to demonstrate to us that there is a certain level of deter-
rence, and we shouldn’t think that, just because we have struck this nuclear deal, 
the Iranians are projecting weakness. This is what I think the strategic thinking 
is, in part, for why they are doing this swarming. Now, obviously, I disagree with 
that thinking, and I think what they are doing is reckless. But because we don’t 
have those channels of communication to try and iron out some rules of the 
road, it is very easy for them to do. 
But also, I think Iran’s internal politics is at a crossroads. You have different ac-
tors within the Iranian political system and within the Iranian military pecking 
order who want to go in either one direction or another. There are some people 
in the Iranian system who believe that greater engagement with the outside 
world can help achieve Iran’s strategic interests and resolve a lot of problems 
peacefully. There are others who think that the United States and other Western 
countries will never accept the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has been the 
governing system since 1979. Because it will never be accepted, Iranians must 
do everything in their power to resist American power projection in the Middle 
East. I think that’s a dangerous line of thinking, and I also think it’s incorrect, 
because the idea of finding mutually agreed-upon solutions in the Persian Gulf 
and the Middle East, broadly conceived, between the United States, Iran, and 
other stakeholders in the region, hasn’t truly been tested. I don’t blame US 
military officials for going to the podium and saying, “Look the Iranians better 
be careful. Otherwise they might bite off more than they can chew.” I think the 
Iranians need to hear that. I think we have shown the proper level of restraint. 
Going forward, if the Iranians continue to challenge our ships, then I think 
it’s worthwhile for the US government to send messages to the very top of the 
Iranian food chain to say, “This has to stop, and if it doesn’t, here is a clearly 
I don’t blame US military 
officials for saying, “Look, the 
Iranians better be careful. 
Otherwise they might bite off 
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outlined set of actions that the US government will take.” I think the Iranians 
will get the message. 
BORER: Do you think that the idea of containing Iran has already, to a certain 
degree, dissolved, given Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and its 
increasing influence in Yemen—essentially in the region writ large?  On the flip 
side, do you think that Iran has already overextended itself ? 
MARASHI: On the latter point, yes. I am a big believer in looking at things from 
a geopolitical lens as opposed to an ideological lens. Through a geopolitical lens, 
I see Iran overextended, particularly in Syria and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and 
I see the United States thinking that maybe it wouldn’t be such a bad thing to 
try and bleed out the Iranians and make them pay for what they are doing. This 
is exactly what Iran did to us in Iraq from 2003 until about 2011, depending on 
whom you talk to. So it’s a little bit of payback. Now, that being said, Iranian 
policy in the region has always vacillated, whether it has been more interven-
tionist or demonstrating more restraint. It depends on what is going on in the 
region. 
In my view, containing Iran has always been a fool’s errand because trying to 
contain a regional power is always a losing battle. When I look at things through 
a geopolitical lens, I understand the need for a balance of power. Iran already is 
a regional power; it’s not seeking to become one. I would argue that it’s always 
been one. I would say the same thing about Saudi Arabia. I think they both are 
the pillars of regional power and regional security in the Middle East. Frankly, 
that view has been shared by most US officials as far back as [former US president 
Richard] Nixon and possibly even before him. People make the argument for 
containment, but I think it’s a short- to medium-term argument, and they are 
looking at the solution according to a short- to medium-term trajectory, because 
you cannot contain a regional power indefinitely. The cost of doing so in blood 
and treasure increases exponentially as time passes. One would think we had 
learned our lesson with Saddam Hussein and Iraq. The policy toward Hussein 
was containment, so why did we have to invade if containment was working? 
What is the end goal of containment? Is it to overthrow the regime and install 
somebody who is more pliable with regard to American interests? Or is it to find 
some kind of modus operandi with the government to stop it from doing things 
that are destructive to American interests? I think this needs to be more clearly 
defined.
So, if it’s not going to be containment, I personally favor focusing on balance of 
power, and I think that’s more in the US national interest. Maintaining a balance 
of power is what we were doing up until 1992, frankly—and we didn’t have a 
good relationship with Iran prior to 1992 either. I think both Ronald Reagan, 
through the Iran-Contra arms deal, and George H.W. Bush at various points 
during his administration, sought to find covert channels of communication 
with the Iranian government because they understood that Iran is a powerful 
country, and it needs to be engaged on some level. Maybe they thought we 
shouldn’t be overly reliant on our traditional partners in the region because those 
partners could use and abuse the relationship with the United States to achieve 
their interests at the expense of our own. When our interests overlap tactically 
or strategically with the Saudis or the Egyptians or other traditional American 
partners, that’s great. But sometimes, as has been the case in Afghanistan and 
Iran can be engaged on 
some issues to test the 
proposition of working 
together to achieve what is 




Iraq at various points in time, for example, it might be 
tactically or strategically in our interests to either commu-
nicate with or collaborate with the Iranians. Why not test 
the proposition? If doing so is in the US national interest, 
then I don’t think that ideology, traditional partners, 
or domestic politics should get in the way. Iran can be 
engaged on some issues to test the proposition of working 
together to achieve what is in the US national interest. I 
think the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [the nuclear 
deal] demonstrates that if Iran sees it to be in their interest, 
they are willing to have those conversations, and talks can 
prove to be successful. 
BORER: The attempted military coup in Turkey added a 
new variable, if you will, into the region.10 And then the 
Turkish government showed a seemingly resurgent interest 
in more forcefully interacting in Syria. Do you think that 
Turkey’s increased involvement further complicates things 
for the United States, or 
does it actually help to have 
a long-standing regional ally 
be more assertive in its own 
neighborhood? 
MARASHI: It depends on 
how responsible those asser-
tive actions of our traditional 
partners actually are in 
practice. I think that in Syria 
and Yemen, and even in Iraq, 
the Turks and the Saudis, 
both of which are traditional 
American partners, have 
become susceptible to impe-
rial overreach. Frankly, they didn’t learn from the mistakes 
that the United States made in 2003. When we intervened 
in Iraq, we didn’t have a clearly defined endgame. I am very 
skeptical of military intervention that doesn’t have a clearly 
defined endgame because mission creep kicks in, and how 
do you define the strategic objectives? I think our strategic 
objectives in Iraq have changed over time—multiple times, 
frankly. 
Now I think the same thing is happening to the Saudis and 
the Turks. Victory as defined by the Saudi government 
in Yemen when it first intervened is very different from 
how it defines victory today. It’s not clear to me what the 
Turks’ strategic objective for intervening in Syria is. They 
say that they want to push back the Kurds. They say they 
are flexible about the degree to which [Syrian president 
Bashar al] Assad is part of a political transition—if a 
political solution can be reached that will stop the killing. 
But Turkey hasn’t clearly defined what will cause it to pull 
Turkish troops out of Syria. I would frankly say the same 
thing about Iran. What is the clearly defined endgame? 
If it’s Assad surviving and never leaving power, then there 
will be an intractable conflict because durable solutions 
to conflict require the buy-in of every country with the 
capacity to wreck the solution. This means that Syria can’t 
be solved without Iran, but it also can’t be solved without 
the United States, Turkey, and Russia because they have all 
made themselves players. They are all supporting different 
actors in the proxy war. Nobody has clean hands. 
I would say the same thing to a lesser degree about Yemen, 
because I don’t think Iran has intervened there in the same 
way that the Saudis have. I would say the same thing about 
Iraq, as well. Nobody can force any kind of military or 
political solution on anyone else. If you can’t win outright 
by exerting force, then the conflict becomes this cycle of 
escalation, where one side 
escalates, and then the other 
side says, “We have to escalate 
as well, because we don’t want 
to be subdued and pushed 
into some solution that 
doesn’t achieve our interests, 
however we define them.” 
Well, as the different actors 
continue to escalate, one after 
the other, eventually they are 
going to run out of escalatory 
options short of direct mili-
tary conflict, which is why it’s 
so important to have those 
channels of communication. 
You need an off-ramp so that you don’t reach the worst 
possible outcome. I don’t think that’s something that the 
Turks, the Saudis, and the Emiratis have fully internalized. 
I think the United States is much more cognizant of this 
danger now because we have been doing this kind of opera-
tion for 15 years, since 9/11. I think the [Barack Obama 
administration] is asking our allies to do more and that’s 
right, because we don’t want free riders. That’s important, 
and I give the Obama administration credit for pointing 
out that our traditional partners do need to do more. Our 
traditional partners are going through some growing pains 
because, for decades, they have outsourced their security 
to the United States. When you outsource your security, 
you are inherently insecure. Those governments are not 
used to doing any sort of moderate or light lifting, never 
mind heavy lifting. So there is going to be a learning curve. 
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have more restraint in their power projection. Just like the 
United States does now.  
There is a difference between Iranian and Saudi power 
projection in the region. Both have clients, non-state actors, 
that they throw out into the region to do destabilizing 
things. The difference is that the Iranians have these non-
state actors in Iraq and Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
If Iran says jump, they ask how high. If Iran says do more, 
they do more. If Iran says stop and pull back, that is exactly 
what they do: they stop and pull back. Iran has control. The 
Saudis don’t have that kind of control over the non-state 
actors that they fund. If anything, they tell these non-state 
actors, “Do what you want to do, just don’t do it in the 
kingdom. Better that you do it elsewhere, whether it’s in 
the United States or other places in the region.” The Saudis 
don’t care, and I think that’s extremely reckless. It’s much 
more damaging to US interests than what the Iranians are 
doing. But there is nothing we can do to get the Saudis to 
rein these actors in because the Saudis have injected a poi-
sonous, intolerant, minority strain of Islam into the region 
and they don’t have the wherewithal to pull it back. The 
Iranians do, and I think that’s a very important difference.
BORER: What are your thoughts on the danger of people 
making mistakes in this escalatory 
cycle? Hezbollah has been more active 
in Lebanon lately and may be consid-
ering a confrontation with Israel on 
the Golan Heights. Do you have any 
observations to share on that? 
MARASHI: I think Hezbollah is stretched thin in an unprec-
edented manner. On the one hand, Lebanon is its priority. 
But to project its power domestically inside of Lebanon, it 
needs that strategic passageway through Syria to connect 
to Iran, because Hezbollah is an Iranian client. I don’t 
think the Iranians or Hezbollah thought that the war 
in Syria would drag on as long as it has, or that it would 
become the proxy war that it has become. I think both are 
looking for a way out because as they continue to dedicate 
manpower, resources, blood, and treasure for the fight in 
Syria, they become more vulnerable to an Israeli military 
attack in Lebanon, much like we saw in 2006. 
I don’t think Hezbollah wants to take a whack at Israel, 
because it would be biting off more than it can chew. I 
think the Israelis are having very serious conversations 
about whether now is the right time to take another whack 
at Lebanon because Hezbollah is overstretched. I have had 
these discussions with Israelis when I’ve traveled there. I 
think that idea is dangerous and reckless on the part of 
Israel. I understand why, from a geopolitical perspective, 
they might want to discuss it, but I also think it’s short-
sighted because Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors have 
done a very good job of integrating Hezbollah into the 
political, economic, and social fabric of Lebanon. While I 
am not a fan of Hezbollah, I think it is there to stay. 
So then the question becomes, how do we get it to stop 
doing destructive and reckless things, so that Lebanon can 
become politically, economically, and socially stable in a 
way that, frankly, we haven’t seen in quite some time? I 
don’t think we can test that proposition until the war in 
Syria is solved—until we have some kind of solution that 
is amenable to all sides. In Syria right now, there are too 
many actors that are supporting various sides in the proxy 
war, and they’re all viewing the fight through a zero-sum 
lens. Iran and Hezbollah are two of them. This mentality 
of “If I am not winning, then I must be losing” must be 
abandoned, just as it was jettisoned to solve the Lebanese 
civil war, for example. Until all sides realize that a political 
solution that stops the killing is actually in their long-term 
geopolitical interest, I think we will continue to see the 
bloodshed that we see now. Hezbollah will continue to be 
stretched thin. Who has escalation dominance in Syria? I 
would argue that the Iranians and Hezbollah have it. For 
Hezbollah, it’s existential: Syria is their 
supply line. For Iran, it’s about deter-
rence vis à vis Israel, because that’s why 
Iran supports Hezbollah. There is an 
ideological component as well, and it’s 
an avenue for Iran’s power projection 
into the Arab world. It’s much more 
difficult to explain what the US geopolitical interest is in 
Syria, beyond the idea that Syria is on Iran’s side of the 
geopolitical chessboard: “Wouldn’t it be cool if we could 
take Syria from their side and bring it to ours?” I don’t 
disagree that it would be cool and that it would be a net 
strategic benefit over the long run, but then we have to 
have a discussion about the cost. 
BORER: I like to conclude these interviews with what I 
call the “king for a day” question. If you could do just one 
important thing that would help ensure the future of US 
interests, what would it be? 
MARASHI: I would put strict financial limitations on 
money in politics and campaign finance. I would undo 
the Citizens United decision.11 I think the influence of 
private/corporate money in elections is adversely affecting 
the national security of the United States of America and 
poisoning our political system. It’s also preventing us from 
being able to get very important things done that we need 
I don’t think the Iranians 
or Hezbollah thought that 
the war in Syria would 
drag on as long as it has.
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to get done, not just on foreign policy, but particularly on domestic policy. All 
politics is local. I travel the world, and every single day people are asking me 
about what is going on in America. It frightens me when people look at the 
United States of America and question our ability to lead. I don’t like that at 
all. I am a big believer in US power, and I believe that the world is a better place 
when we are projecting our power in a smart, calibrated way. People buy what 
we are selling and have integrated themselves into the international order that 
we have set up, so I have a big problem when they start to question whether it’s 
in their best interest to do so. I think that there is a direct connection from this 
uncertainty to money in politics. We need to check that, and I think doing so 
would free up our politicians to take the kind of actions they need to take to 
sustain US power far into the future.  v
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Boko Haram: The History of an African 
Jihadist Movement
Reviewed by LTC Stans Victor 
Mouaha-Bell, Cameroon Army
THE WRITTEN WORD
The violent Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram exhibits a 
rare ideological complexity compared to other similar movements. Over time, 
the group grafted political motives and religious pretexts onto the core economic 
and social grievances that gave birth to it. Now, after seven years of conflict 
between Boko Haram and the Nigerian army in northeastern Nigeria, the hu-
manitarian situation is catastrophic, and the socioeconomic fabric of the region 
is completely devastated. Since 2011, more than 30,000 people have been killed, 
and almost two million are either internally displaced or refugees in neighboring 
countries. The counterinsurgency forces fighting Boko Haram seem powerless 
to stop violence by the militants in remote parts of Nigeria’s Borno State. The 
political leaders of the countries affected by the Boko Haram insurgency seem to 
operate in a real fog of war. 
Author Alexander Thurston, an assistant professor of African studies at George-
town University, manages to explain the complex environment and context that 
gave birth to Africa’s deadliest terrorist group. Thurston argues at the outset that 
Boko Haram is the outcome of dynamics born from locally grounded ethnoreli-
gious interactions, and that its ruthlessness is partly a result of failed past efforts 
by the government to resolve such conflicts through violence.1 Thurston also 
highlights how Boko Haram has adapted its strategies, discourses, and military 
and political objectives—in short, the group’s ways, means, and ends—to 
respond to external events. 
The book is an outstanding addition to the growing body of literature on both 
African studies and terrorism studies. The background to the author’s research is 
a Nigerian social environment of mistrust and permanent suspicion, marked by 
tensions and crises between ethnic groups and political parties. Using a chrono-
logical approach, Thurston highlights five factors that can explain the rise of 
Boko Haram in northern Nigeria: religious doctrine, poverty and inequality, the 
chaotic political context marked by the end of military rule in 1999, youth un-
employment, and the inaccessible topography of the region. Although Thurston 
distances himself from the all-too-common narrative that Boko Haram formed 
only because of poverty and rampant corruption in Nigeria, he acknowledges 
that the group emerged in a part of Nigeria where the government’s public edu-
cation program registered its greatest failures.2 In the long run, this vacuum was 
filled by Islamist schools led by zealous activist preachers. It is on the interaction 
between religion and politics that Thurston focuses his analysis. 
Understanding Boko Haram requires particular attention not just to the rise 
of religious extremism, but also to the social context in which Boko Haram 
emerged. A counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes suppression cannot be 
viable, and Thurston reasonably maintains that body counts cannot be the only 
metric of its success. To make his point, Thurston revisits nearly 60 years of 
the political and religious history of Nigeria. He notes that, unlike traditional 
terrorist groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and ISIS, which usually 
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start their terror campaigns as small cells before gaining 
importance and expanding, Boko Haram already had a 
very broad popular base before transitioning to armed 
struggle in 2009. This singularity is explained by the 
resonance that the discourse of early Boko Haram 
leaders such as Mohammed Yusuf had among the 
local population, the pattern of Islamic authority in 
northeast Nigeria, and the effectiveness of the group’s 
recruitment techniques among young people. 
Thurston’s analysis reveals four fundamental failures of 
governance that contributed to Boko Haram’s radi-
calization: Nigeria’s contentious politics, economic 
inequality, endemic corruption, and counterproduc-
tive conflict management strategies. Thus, he argues 
that the Nigerian government has been an instigator 
of violence and highlights its responsibility for the 
increased polarization of the region in conflict. This 
position, he notes, is echoed by Kyari Mohammed and 
other Muslim intellectuals who have raised pointed 
questions about the Nigerian government’s response to 
Boko Haram. These scholars believe that the collu-
sion of state authorities and ulama (Muslim clerics), 
combined with the state’s resistance to examining 
the uprising’s root causes, has set the stage for more 
violence.3 
This framework allows Thurston and his readers 
to better understand Boko Haram’s ethnoreligious 
dynamic, the most visible aspects of which are 
antimodernist goals, inflexibility and hostility to 
negotiation, and the total commitment of the group’s 
members. Thus, 
Boko Haram has deployed a doctrine of 
religious exclusivism to claim legitimacy 
for its message. It has presented itself 
both as the victim of other actors’ aggres-
sions and as a righteous vanguard fighting 
for the purity of Islam. The interplay of 
doctrine and events means that there 
is no easy way out of the crisis. Boko 
Haram represents an ugly paradox: its 
ideas have limited appeal but significant 
staying power. The group can be crushed 
militarily, yet the state violence fuels its 
narrative of victimhood.4
Each attack, ambush, and kidnaping fuels questions 
about Boko Haram’s motivations. While regional 
military responses to the group are gradually becoming 
more effective, Thurston insists that no long-lasting Nigerian children imitating Boko Haram terrorists
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solution will emerge without a serious investigation into the political causes of 
the insurgency and the need for political reform.5 He emphasizes that political 
rhetoric is ultimately more important than religious rhetoric and must, there-
fore, be given priority in any proposed solution. 
Throughout his tale, Thurston gives a compelling description of the spread of 
Salafist ideology and the political context in northeastern Nigeria. However, 
his analysis misses one essential point: his examination of the use of the “takfir” 
epithet (declaring other Muslims to be apostates) was very brief, despite the fact 
that it is at the root of the group’s religious legitimization of violence against 
civilians, and prompted serious theological and political debates within Boko 
Haram that eventually split the organization. This shortcoming, however, 
does not decrease the value of the book. All in all, Boko Haram: The History 
of an African Jihadist Movement is a rich and balanced account and very well-
documented. This book is a must-read for anyone who is interested in African 
studies. v 
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After a Boko Haram attack, aid workers asked refugee children  
to draw what they saw and what they missed.
